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CRIMINAL LAW 
CAMRETA AND AL-KIDD: THE SUPREME 





Although few noticed the link between them, two Supreme Court cases 
decided in the same week during the 2010 Term, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd and 
Camreta v. Greene, both involved the Fourth Amendment implications of 
detaining witnesses to a crime.  Al-Kidd, an American citizen, was arrested 
under the federal material witness statute in connection with an 
investigation into terrorist activities, and Greene, a nine-year-old suspected 
victim of child abuse, was seized and interrogated at school by two state 
officials.  The opinions issued in the two cases did little to resolve the 
constitutional issues that arise in witness detention cases, and in fact 
muddied the waters by relying on the Whren line of cases to suggest that 
the motivations underlying the decision to seize a witness are 
constitutionally irrelevant.  In fact, however, the Fourth Amendment 
doctrine that governs these cases is the special needs exception, which 
under Supreme Court precedent does trigger an inquiry into subjective 
motive.  As a result, this Article argues that the Fourth Amendment was 
violated if al-Kidd was pretextually detained because the FBI wanted an 
opportunity to investigate him, but lacked the probable cause to arrest him, 
or if the primary purpose for seizing Greene was to generate evidence in 
connection with the criminal charges pending against her father. 
 
* Professor of Law and Polisher Family Distinguished Faculty Scholar, Penn State 
University Dickinson School of Law.  I was one of the signatories to an amicus brief filed in 
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, which focused on immunity issues not addressed in this Article.  See 
Brief of Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 
S. Ct. 2074 (2011) (No. 10-98). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
They were argued on successive days and decided within the same 
week.  They involved suspected crimes—terrorism and child sexual 
abuse—the very mention of which generates strong visceral reactions.  On 
the surface, the two cases before the Supreme Court during the 2010 
Term—Ashcroft v. al-Kidd
1
 and Camreta v. Greene
2
—did not have much 
else in common.  Al-Kidd was arrested pursuant to a material witness 
warrant and detained for sixteen days in several high-security prisons as 
part of the FBI’s investigation of terrorist activities.  Greene, a nine-year-
old girl, was questioned at school about inappropriate touching state 
officials suspected she had experienced at the hands of her father.  Though 
seemingly quite different, both cases raised the same fundamental question: 
what constitutional constraints does the Fourth Amendment impose on the 
“seizure” of a witness?  When the Term ended and the dust settled, it turned 
out that the Supreme Court had actually said very little.  Even more 
disappointing, the one thing it did tell us—that the reasons animating the 
seizure of a witness are constitutionally irrelevant
3
—fails to recognize that 
witness detentions fall within the Court’s special needs jurisprudence and 
thus should trigger an inquiry into subjective intent. 
In Camreta v. Greene, police received information suggesting that 
Nimrod Greene, who had been arrested on sexual abuse charges involving a 
seven-year-old boy, had also molested his nine-year-old daughter, S.G.  
Several days after learning that Greene had been released from custody, a 
state child protective services caseworker, Bob Camreta, and a county 
deputy sheriff, James Alford, went to interview S.G. at school.  The girl 
was taken out of her classroom and left alone in a room with the two 
officials for an hour or two while Camreta questioned her.  She initially 
denied the allegations of abuse, but after further interrogation reported that 
her father had started molesting her when she was three.  Although S.G. 
later recanted these statements, her father went to trial on the charges 
involving both his daughter and the seven-year-old boy.  The jury was 
unable to reach a verdict.  Greene ultimately entered an Alford plea to the 





1 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011). 
2 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011). 
3 See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083. 
4 See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2027; Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1016–20 (9th Cir. 
2009), vacated as moot, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011). 
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In response to a § 1983 suit filed on S.G.’s behalf by her mother, the 
Ninth Circuit agreed that the girl’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated 
when she was “seize[d] and interrogate[d] . . . in the absence of a warrant, a 
court order, exigent circumstances, or parental consent.”
5
  Nevertheless, the 
court of appeals granted summary judgment to Camreta and Alford on 
qualified immunity grounds, noting that the lower courts were divided on 
the proper analytical framework for evaluating the Fourth Amendment 
issues that arise in child abuse investigations and concluding that the rights 
the officials violated were not clearly established.
6
 
By a vote of seven to two, the Supreme Court determined that the case 
was moot because S.G. was almost eighteen and lived in another state, and 
therefore was “no longer in need of any protection from the challenged 
practice.”
7
  Accordingly, in an opinion written by Justice Kagan, the Court 
vacated the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on the substance of S.G.’s Fourth 
Amendment claim without reaching the merits.
8
 
The Court delved into the substance of the Fourth Amendment a bit in 
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd.  In that case, Abdullah al-Kidd, an African-American 
man who was born in the United States and converted to Islam in college, 
came to the FBI’s attention during an investigation into terrorist activities in 
Idaho.  Two days before al-Kidd was scheduled to leave the country on a 
scholarship to study Arabic and Islamic law at a university in Saudi Arabia, 
FBI agents sought a warrant to detain him under the federal material 
witness statute.  That legislation allows a judge to “order the arrest of [a] 
person” based on a showing that the person’s testimony is “material in a 
 
5 Greene, 588 F.3d at 1030. 
6 See id. at 1026 n.11, 1031–33.  See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 
(1982) (providing that executive branch officials are entitled to qualified immunity in 
constitutional tort suits unless they “violate[d] clearly established . . . constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known”). 
7 Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2034.  In a portion of the majority opinion joined by five 
Justices, the Court also ruled that it had jurisdiction to consider the case even though the cert 
petition was filed by prevailing parties, and that Article III’s requirement of a “personal 
stake” “often will be met when immunized [government] officials seek to challenge a ruling 
[in a § 1983 suit] that their conduct violated the Constitution.”  Id. at 2029.  The other two 
Justices in the majority would not have reached that question, but instead would have 
stopped after finding the case moot.  See id. at 2036–37 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  The two dissenting Justices maintained that the Court did not have jurisdiction to 
consider a cert petition filed by “true prevailing parties.”  Id. at 2040 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting).  For the view that this part of the Court’s decision reflects the Justices’ 
willingness to develop Fourth Amendment law only in “a zone of limited or no remedies,” 
see Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law: A Comment on 
Camreta v. Greene and Davis v. United States, 2010–11 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 237, 258. 
8 See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2036 & n.11. 
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criminal proceeding” and that “it may become impracticable to secure the 
presence of the person by subpoena.”
9
  Al-Kidd was arrested at Washington 
Dulles International Airport, then interrogated and held for sixteen days in 
high-security cells in three different states.  At that point, a judge released 
him on the condition that he limit his travel to four states, relinquish his 
passport, report to a probation officer, and agree to home visits.  These 
conditions were eventually removed after fifteen months.  Al-Kidd was 
never charged with a crime or called as a witness in any trial.
10
 
Al-Kidd filed a Bivens action against numerous federal agencies and 
officials, including former Attorney General John Ashcroft.  His complaint 
alleged that federal officials, acting pursuant to a policy devised by 
Ashcroft, were misusing material witness warrants in cases where they had 
no genuine interest in securing testimony, but really wanted opportunities to 
investigate suspected terrorists whom they did not have probable cause to 
arrest.
11
  The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss,
12
 a 
ruling that was appealed only by Ashcroft.  A divided panel of the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district judge’s decision.
13
  Citing dicta from the 
Second Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Awadallah,
14
 the Ninth Circuit 
 
9 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006).  The provision provides in full: 
If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person is material in a 
criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure the presence 
of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer may order the arrest of the person and treat the 
person in accordance with the provisions of section 3142 of this title.  No material witness may 
be detained because of inability to comply with any condition of release if the testimony of such 
witness can adequately be secured by deposition, and if further detention is not necessary to 
prevent a failure of justice.  Release of a material witness may be delayed for a reasonable period 
of time until the deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
10 See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2079 (2011); al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 
949, 951–54 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011). 
11 See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079; see also Ricardo J. Bascuas, The Unconstitutionality 
of “Hold Until Cleared”: Reexamining Material Witness Detentions in the Wake of the 
September 11th Dragnet, 58 VAND. L. REV. 677, 699 (2005) (noting that the Justice 
Department “has made no secret” of its use of material witness warrants “to investigate and 
interrogate . . . possible terrorists”); Donald R. Cochran, Material Witness Detention in a 
Post-9/11 World: Mission Creep or Fresh Start?, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 15 (2010) 
(agreeing that “there appears to be no doubt” of this fact); cf. James G. Cook, The Detention 
of Material Witnesses and the Fourth Amendment, 76 MISS. L.J. 585, 612 (2006) (observing 
that the federal material witness statute is “rarely used in other than terrorist-related 
investigations”). 
12 See al-Kidd v. Gonzales, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70283 (D. Idaho Sept. 27, 2006). 
13 See al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d at 957–77.  
14 349 F.3d 42, 59 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[I]t would be improper for the government to use 
§ 3144 for other ends, such as the detention of persons suspected of criminal activity for 
which probable cause has not yet been established.”); see also United States v. Awadallah, 
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concluded that al-Kidd’s claim that “he was arrested without probable cause 
pursuant to a general policy, designed and implemented by Ashcroft, whose 
programmatic purpose was not to secure testimony, but to investigate those 




The Supreme Court reversed by a vote of five to three.
16
  Relying on 
its holding in Whren v. United States that the Fourth Amendment’s 
“concern with ‘reasonableness’” permits certain law enforcement actions 
“whatever the subjective intent” of the individual government officials 
involved,
17
 the al-Kidd majority held that the motivation underlying a 
decision to arrest a material witness is constitutionally irrelevant.  “Efficient 
and evenhanded application of the law demands that we look to whether the 
arrest is objectively justified, rather than to the motive of the arresting 
officer,” Justice Scalia’s majority opinion explained.
18
  But the Court 
stopped there, assuming the validity of the warrant used to arrest al-Kidd 
and noting that his Fourth Amendment claims against the agents who 
obtained the warrant “are not before us.”
19
  Justice Kennedy, who 
represented the fifth vote for the majority opinion, wrote a separate 
concurrence, pointing out that the Court had not resolved the “difficult[]” 
issues surrounding the propriety of “the Government’s use of the Material 




202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 77 n.28 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Relying on the material witness statute to 
detain people who are presumed innocent . . . in order to prevent potential crimes is an 
illegitimate use of the statute.”), rev’d on other grounds, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003). 
15 al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 969.  The panel further held that Ashcroft was entitled to neither 
absolute prosecutorial immunity nor qualified immunity.  See id. at 957–64, 970–73. 
16 Justice Kagan did not participate in the decision.  See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2074. 
17 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996). 
18 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011); see also Bascuas, supra note 11, at 
698 (criticizing the federal government’s pretextual use of material witness warrants, but 
agreeing that “the Fourth Amendment is not concerned with the government’s motives for 
arresting any witness”). 
19 al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083 n.3 (commenting that “[t]he validity of the warrant . . . is 
the premise of al-Kidd’s argument”).  But see id. at 2087 & n.1 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (finding this assumption “puzzling” and noting that al-Kidd’s complaint did 
not concede the validity of the warrant).  The Court went on to hold that Ashcroft was 
protected by qualified immunity regardless of the constitutionality of his actions, and did not 
reach “the more difficult question” of his entitlement to absolute immunity.  Id. at 2085 
(majority opinion). 
20 Id. at 2085–86 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  The three Justices in the minority joined this 
part of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.  Those three Justices would have ruled only that 
Ashcroft was entitled to qualified immunity; they would not have reached the “novel and 
trying questions” surrounding the merits of al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment argument.  Id. at 
2087 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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Thus, the Court’s opinions in these two cases left open fundamental 
questions surrounding the constitutionality of witness detentions.
21
  
Although one noted Fourth Amendment scholar has opined that these issues 
“will seldom arise in court,” because witness seizures rarely lead to 
evidence that becomes the subject of a motion to suppress,
22
 cases like 
Camreta and al-Kidd will likely recur.  In the wake of September 11th, the 
federal government made aggressive use of material witness warrants in 
terrorism investigations.
23
  Similarly, state officials have reason to prefer 
interviewing suspected child abuse victims at school,
24
 and the division 
among the lower courts on the Fourth Amendment issues arising in child 




21 Although the Court had not previously ruled on the Fourth Amendment implications of 
witness detentions, earlier decisions had held that the arrest of a material witness does not 
effect a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, see Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 
547, 589 (1973), and had also rejected a Privileges and Immunities Clause challenge to the 
Uniform Law to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses (though it declined to decide whether 
the denial of bail violates due process), see New York v. O’Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 6–8 (1959).  In 
addition, there is dictum in several other Supreme Court opinions arguably supporting the 
constitutionality of the federal material witness statute.  See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 
156, 184 (1953) (noting that “[t]he duty to disclose knowledge of crime . . . is so vital that 
one known to be innocent may be detained, in the absence of bail, as a material witness”); 
Barry v. United States, 279 U.S. 597, 617 (1929) (observing that “[t]he constitutionality of 
[the federal material witness] statute has never been doubted”).  But cf. Bascuas, supra note 
11, at 725–31 (finding “no support in any Supreme Court case for the prolonged or indefinite 
detention” of material witnesses under the federal statute); Cook, supra note 11, at 598–602 
(observing that “surprisingly the Supreme Court has never been called upon to consider the 
constitutionality of the material witness statute”). 
22 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
§ 9.2(b), at 289 (4th ed. 2004). 
23 See, e.g., Ronald L. Carlson, Distorting Due Process for Noble Purposes: The 
Emasculation of America’s Material Witness Laws, 42 GA. L. REV. 941, 970 (2008) (noting 
that “things changed radically” after September 11th); Cochran, supra note 11, at 10 (citing 
reports putting the number of post-September 11th material witness detainees somewhere 
between forty and seventy). 
24 See, e.g., Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Camreta’s 
comment that school interviews are “a regular part of [child protective services] practice”), 
vacated as moot, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011); Brief of the States of Arizona, et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 38–40, Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (Nos. 
09-1454, 09-1478) (amicus brief filed on behalf of forty states and the District of Columbia 
arguing that school interviews of suspected child abuse victims are reasonable); Doriane 
Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the Children: The Ironic Costs of a Child 
Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 413, 438 (2005) 
(citing state statutes and explaining why interviews are conducted at school). 
25 See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also infra note 116 (citing conflicting 
cases). 
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This Article analyzes the constitutional implications of witness 
seizures, concluding that they are a form of administrative intrusion and 
therefore must satisfy the dictates of the Court’s special needs 
jurisprudence.  Law enforcement officials wear different hats and play 
different roles, and when they are conducting criminal investigations, any 
seizure they make requires traditional probable cause and a warrant, or 
some exception to those requirements.  By contrast, the special needs 
exception comes into play when they are acting in an administrative 
capacity.  But justifying a seizure under that doctrine requires proof that the 
primary purpose animating the detention was something other than the 
goals of ordinary criminal law enforcement.  That burden cannot be met if 
the FBI arrested al-Kidd to buy time while investigating his activities, or if 
the immediate goal for seizing S.G. was to collect evidence to be used in 
prosecuting the charges pending against her father. 
In exploring these issues, the Article proceeds in three parts.  Part II 
discusses the Supreme Court’s traditional Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, first addressing probable cause and reasonable suspicion and 
then several warrant exceptions.  Finding no justification for witness 
seizures down any of these paths, Part III turns to the special needs cases 
and concludes that any attempt to take advantage of this doctrine requires 
an inquiry into the subjective motivation underlying a witness detention.  
Moreover, in cases where constitutional challenges are leveled at a 
discretionary witness detention decision made by particular government 
actors, rather than at the administrative scheme as a whole, that purpose 
inquiry must focus on the individual officials involved to ensure that the 
seizure was designed to serve administrative rather than law enforcement 
goals.  Finally, Part IV considers the general reasonableness balancing 
approach the Court has applied in several recent Fourth Amendment 
decisions, pointing out that the privacy interests infringed by the seizure of 
innocent witnesses weigh heavily against the government in these cases.  
All bets are off, however, when it comes to predicting the outcome of such 
a balancing test, and the Article concludes that the special needs doctrine is 
the more appropriate vehicle for analyzing the constitutionality of witness 
detentions. 
II. “ORDINARY” FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
Under the Court’s “ordinary” Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
26
 a 
search or seizure requires both probable cause and a warrant, or some 
 
26 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1966). 
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established exception to these requirements.
27
  A less intrusive Terry stop 
and frisk may be performed based only on reasonable suspicion and itself 
constitutes one such warrant exception.
28
  This Part looks first at the 
concepts of probable cause and reasonable suspicion, and then several 
plausible warrant exceptions, finding no available tool there to justify 
witness detentions. 
A. PROBABLE CAUSE AND REASONABLE SUSPICION 
A major hurdle for the government in trying to justify the seizure of 
witnesses is that the concept of probable cause historically has referred to a 
belief that the person being detained herself committed some crime.  As the 
Court put it in Beck v. Ohio, the constitutionality of an arrest turns on 
whether the police “had probable cause to make it—whether . . . the facts 
and circumstances . . . were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing 
that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.”
29
  The 
usual concept of probable cause therefore does not encompass reason to 
believe an individual has information that might lead to probable cause to 
arrest another. 
The same is true of the reasonable suspicion required to stop.  In its 
landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court relied on a 
balancing test—weighing “‘the need to search [or seize] against the 
invasion which the search [or seizure] entails’”—to justify creating the 
stop-and-frisk exception to the warrant requirement (and to probable 
 
27 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); see also, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ 
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).  But cf. Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s 
Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 978 (identifying five “irreconcilable” 
models used in the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and arguing that the 
Court “choose[s] whichever model it sees fit to apply”). 
28 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
29 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (emphasis added); see also Maryland v. Pringle, 
540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (“We have stated . . . that ‘[t]he substance of all the definitions of 
probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,’ and that the belief of guilt must be 
particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized.” (quoting Ybarra v. 
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979))); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979) (“This 
Court repeatedly has explained that ‘probable cause’ to justify an arrest means facts and 
circumstances . . . that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person . . . in believing . . . that the 
suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.”); Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. at 26 (referring to an arrest as “the initial stage of a criminal prosecution,” and 
noting that “an officer may lawfully arrest a person only when he is apprised of facts 
sufficient to warrant a belief that the person has committed or is committing a crime”); 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (“‘The substance of all the definitions’ 
of probable cause ‘is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.’” (quoting McCarthy v. 
DeArmit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881))).  See generally Cook, supra note 11, at 603 (noting that this 
definition of probable cause “never has . . . been doubted”). 
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cause).
30
  “[E]ffective crime prevention and detection,” the Court reasoned, 
requires that police be able to “approach a person for purposes of 
investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable 
cause to make an arrest.”
31
  As the Court later described the reasonable 
suspicion standard, police must have “a particularized and objective basis 
for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.”
32
 
The Court extended Terry in United States v. Hensley to allow stops 
made to “investigate past criminal activity,” at least those offenses that rise 
to the level of felonies.
33
  But here again the Court only endorsed the stop of 
an individual “suspected of involvement” in the previous crime based on 
reasonable suspicion that the person herself “was involved in or is wanted 
in connection with a completed felony.”
34
 
An extension of the usual understanding of probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion is therefore necessary to allow government officials to 
seize witnesses like al-Kidd and S.G.  That is not to say that law 
enforcement’s hands are tied in interviewing witnesses in the course of 
criminal investigations.  The Fourth Amendment governs only police 
activity that rises to the level of a “seizure” or a “search.”
35
  Thus, officers 
may certainly ask questions of prospective witnesses, approach them, and 
 
30 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–21 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967)). 
31 Id. at 22. 
32 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981) (emphasis added); see also 
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (requiring “‘a particularized and 
objective’ basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity” (quoting Cortez, 449 
U.S. at 417–18)). 
33 United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985). 
34 Id. at 229.  Any seizure of a witness attempting to fit within the confines of a Terry 
stop must also be limited in duration.  Although the Court held in United States v. Sharpe, 
470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985), that the key inquiry was whether the police were “diligently 
pursu[ing] a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions 
quickly,” and it “decline[d] to adopt any outside time limitation” for a Terry stop in United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983), the Court also refused to allow a stop of an hour 
and half in the latter case, noting that “we have never approved a seizure . . . for the 
prolonged 90-minute period involved here.”  Id. at 709–10.  The duration of the interview in 
Camreta was disputed, with S.G. alleging that it went on for two hours and the defendants 
countering that it lasted only an hour.  See Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1017 n.1 (9th 
Cir. 2009), vacated as moot, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).  But certainly al-Kidd’s sixteen-day 
detention can hardly be considered a mere Terry stop.  See generally 4 LAFAVE, supra note 
22, § 9.2(f), at 337 n.206, 340 n.216 (citing lower court cases allowing stops of an hour, but 
generally disapproving of those lasting two hours or more). 
35 Cf. Coleman, supra note 24, at 430 (noting that the overwhelming majority of child 
abuse investigations are “conducted with the apparent consent of relevant adults”). 
292 KIT KINPORTS [Vol. 102 
seek their cooperation.
36
  But they must stop short of “seizing” a witness—
taking steps that would lead a reasonable person in her position to feel she 
was not “‘free to leave,’” “free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise 
terminate the encounter”—absent reasonable suspicion that the witness 
herself may be involved in a crime.
37
 
As the Court pointed out in al-Kidd, the Whren line of cases does 
make clear that seizures that are “‘otherwise lawful’” do not violate the 
Fourth Amendment simply because of a government official’s “‘subjective 
intent alone.’”
38
  In the words of the al-Kidd majority, “ulterior motives” do 
not invalidate “an objectively reasonable traffic stop” or other “searches 
that are legitimate for other reasons.”
39
  Thus, for example, when police 
 
36 See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002) (“Law enforcement 
officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely 
by approaching individuals on the street or in other public places and putting questions to 
them if they are willing to listen.”); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434–35 (1991) (same). 
37 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435–36 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 
(1988)).  Al-Kidd was unquestionably subject to an arrest, and the Camreta defendants did 
not challenge the district court’s finding that S.G. was “seized” on the facts there.  See 
Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated as moot, 131 S. Ct. 2020 
(2011).  Some amicus briefs filed in the Supreme Court did, however, dispute that issue.  See 
Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Petitioner, James Alford, Deputy Sheriff, Deschutes 
County, Oregon, by the Los Angeles County District Attorney at 9–18, Camreta v. Greene, 
131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (No. 09-1478); Brief of the California State Association of Counties, 
and League of California Cities as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 11–22, Camreta 
v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (Nos. 09-1454, 09-1478).  Any analysis of that question in 
subsequent cases must take into account the Court’s recent holding that the comparable 
“reasonable suspect” standard used to define custody for purposes of Miranda must consider 
the age of a child, at least if her age was “known to the officer at the time of the interview, or 
would have been objectively apparent to any reasonable officer.”  J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 
131 S. Ct. 2394, 2404 (2011). 
The finding that an individual was seized seemingly forecloses a claim of voluntary 
consent, which would dispense with both the warrant requirement and the need to show 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion.  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 
(1973).  In any event, an argument based on consent would obviously be unavailing in al-
Kidd.  In Camreta, there was no contention that nine-year-old S.G. was herself capable of 
giving consent, and the whole point of interviewing her at school was to avoid seeking 
consent from her parents.  See Coleman, supra note 24, at 438; Brief of the States of 
Arizona, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 24, at 39.  Nevertheless, 
a victim of child abuse, especially an older one, could conceivably give consent to a school 
interview.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 
(2011) (Nos. 09-1457, 09-1478) (Justice Alito questions whether a “child at 16 [is] incapable 
of consenting”).  But in those circumstances, a reasonable child in the same situation would 
presumably feel free to leave the meeting and no Fourth Amendment “seizure” would occur. 
38 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (emphasis added) (quoting Scott v. 
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).  For further discussion of Whren, see infra notes 
154–57 and accompanying text. 
39 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2082 (2011). 
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have the probable cause or reasonable suspicion required for an arrest or 
stop, their underlying motivation does not “strip the agents of their legal 
justification.”
40
  But these statements beg the question whether detention is 
“legitimate”—or “otherwise lawful”—absent probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion that the individual herself is involved in criminal activity.  
Certainly, the Whren line of cases teaches that probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion to believe the detainee committed or is about to commit a crime 
justifies an arrest or stop, regardless of the officer’s underlying reason for 
deciding to seize the individual.
41
  Under those circumstances, traditional 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion itself makes the seizure reasonable.  
But, as discussed above, the usual concepts of probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion do not apply simply because there is reason to believe 
the detainee witnessed a crime.  Some alternative “legal justification” is 
required to make the seizure of a witness “objectively reasonable” and thus 
“otherwise lawful” under the Whren line of cases. 
It is conceivable that the same balancing test that led to Terry and 
Hensley might justify expanding the stop-and-frisk doctrine to allow the 
seizure of witnesses.  Although the competing interests implicated by 
witness detentions are addressed in detail below,
42
 suffice it to say here that 
strong arguments militate against such an extension of the stop-and-frisk 
cases.  On one side of the balance, the privacy interests are much weightier 
when the individuals who are seized are not themselves suspects but merely 
innocent victims or witnesses.
43
  On the other side of the scales, the “crime 
 
40 Whren, 517 U.S. at 812; see also id. at 813 (likewise observing that “‘the fact that the 
officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide 
the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as 
the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action’” (quoting Scott v. United States, 
436 U.S. at 138)).  But see Kit Kinports, Criminal Procedure in Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 71, 77–95 (2007) (pointing out that the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence has seen a fair amount of fluctuation between objective and subjective 
standards). 
41 See Whren, 517 U.S. at 819 (rejecting a claim of pretext and concluding that the traffic 
stop was reasonable because police had probable cause of a traffic violation); see also 
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (concluding that a police officer’s 
“subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the 
known facts provide probable cause”); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771–72 (2001) 
(per curiam) (holding that custodial arrest for a “fine-only traffic violation,” which led to the 
discovery of narcotics during an inventory search of a vehicle, was not “‘rendered invalid by 
the fact that it was “a mere pretext for a narcotics search”’” (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 
813) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1 (1973))). 
42 See infra notes 194–208 & 224–28 and accompanying text. 
43 Cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1982) (“If it is cruel and unusual 
punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to 
confine the involuntarily committed—who may not be punished at all—in unsafe 
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prevention” half of the government interest in “effective crime prevention 
and detection” relied on in Terry is diminished in cases where witnesses are 
seized.
44
  Of course, that was true in Hensley as well, where the Court 
instead cited a policy more akin to Terry’s “crime detection”—“the strong 
government interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice.”
45
  
But in both cases these policy concerns imply a species of exigency: the 
goals of preventing an imminent crime and thereby protecting the public 
safety in Terry,
46
 and the prospect in Hensley that a suspect “police have 
been unable to locate” might “flee in the interim and . . . remain at large.”
47
  
Thus, the lower courts have consistently—and properly—refused to extend 
Terry to permit the seizure of witnesses, except in situations where a crime 
has just occurred and the police have an immediate need to ascertain the 
facts and identify potential witnesses.
48
 
Although the al-Kidd majority did not discuss these questions at any 
length, given its assumption that al-Kidd admitted the validity of the 
material witness warrant used to arrest him,
49
 the various opinions issued in 
the case did include some preliminary observations relevant to the 
definitions of probable cause and reasonable suspicion.  At one point, 
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court acknowledged that the Framers’ 
hostility to general warrants might “perhaps” suggest that the reference to 
“probable cause” in the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause “meant only 
probable cause to suspect a violation of law,” and not probable cause that 
“the individual named in the warrant was a material witness.”
50
  But that 
proposition, Justice Scalia continued, would render all material witness 
warrants unconstitutional, “whether pretextual or not.”
51
  Because that 
prospect went beyond the argument pressed by al-Kidd, the Court chose to 
leave it unresolved.  The fears expressed by the majority, however, 
 
conditions.”); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979) (“This Court has recognized a 
distinction between punitive measures that may not constitutionally be imposed prior to a 
determination of guilt and regulatory restraints that may.”); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 
523, 530 (1967) (rejecting as “anomalous” the proposition that “the individual and his 
private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is 
suspected of criminal behavior”). 
44 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). 
45 United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985). 
46 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (pointing out that it was “necessary for the protection of [the 
officer] and others to take swift measures to discover the true facts and neutralize the threat 
of harm”). 
47 Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229. 
48 See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 9.2(b), at 289–92. 
49 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
50 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084–85 (2011). 
51 Id. at 2085. 
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overstate the implications of confining the concepts of probable cause (and 
reasonable suspicion) to their traditional meanings.  While probable cause 
that someone is a material witness may not be the basis for a traditional 
warrant, it might nevertheless justify the issuance of a Camara-type warrant 
under the “special needs” administrative search exception to the warrant 
requirement.
52
  That exception is taken up in Part III of this Article. 
The al-Kidd majority’s second reference to these issues cuts clearly in 
the other direction.  In response to a separate opinion written by Justice 
Ginsburg and joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, the Court took 
issue with Justice Ginsburg’s observation that “[t]he word ‘suspicion’ . . . 
ordinarily indicates that the person suspected has engaged in 
wrongdoing.”
53
  Citing “common” and “idiomatic” examples like “I have a 
suspicion she is throwing me a surprise birthday party,” the majority argued 
that the precedents cited by the three Justices “prove nothing except that 
searches and seizures for reasons other than suspected wrongdoing are 
rare.”
54
  “The import of the term in legal argot is not genuinely debatable,” 
Justice Ginsburg convincingly retorted.
55
  Moreover, as discussed below, 
Fourth Amendment intrusions for “other” purposes are not “rare.”  They 
are, in fact, quite common, and are constitutionally permissible assuming 
they satisfy the requirements of the Court’s “special needs” jurisprudence.
56
 
Justice Kennedy, who represented the fifth vote for the majority, also 
wrote separately, weighing in on these questions in a concurrence joined by 
the three Justices who signed on to the Ginsburg opinion.  Acknowledging 
that “[t]he typical arrest warrant”—unlike a material witness warrant—“is 
 
52 See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (concluding that “‘the facts that 
would justify an inference of “probable cause” to make an [administrative] inspection are 
clearly different from those that would justify such an inference where a criminal 
investigation has been undertaken,’” and that “probable cause” for a housing inspection 
warrant turns on “reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area 
inspection” (quoting Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 383 (1959) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting))); see also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877–78 & n.4 (1987) (noting the 
distinction between the “probable cause” required for “administrative search warrants” and 
for “constitutionally mandated judicial warrants”); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 & 
n.5 (1978) (observing that “[t]he showing of probable cause” needed for a warrant depends 
on “the object” of the search, and setting out the requirements for an administrative warrant 
to investigate the cause of a fire). 
53 al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2088 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing 
numerous Supreme Court precedents that “have uniformly used the term ‘individualized 
suspicion’ to mean ‘individualized suspicion of wrongdoing’”). 
54 Id. at 2082 n.2 (majority opinion). 
55 Id. at 2088 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment). 
56 In fact, these searches now consume an entire volume of the LaFave search and 
seizure treatise.  See 5 LAFAVE, supra note 22, §§ 10.1–.11, at 3-541. 
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based on probable cause that the arrestee has committed a crime,” Justice 
Kennedy commended the Court for discussing “only the legal theory put 
before it” and leaving open the “difficult[]” issues surrounding “when 
material witness arrests might be consistent with statutory and 
constitutional requirements.”
57
  Justice Kennedy went on to observe that 
even if material witness warrants do not fall within the Warrant Clause, 
they might nevertheless be constitutional under the Fourth Amendment’s 
“separate reasonableness requirement for seizures of the person.”
58
  In 
support of this comment, Justice Kennedy cited the Court’s decision in 
United States v. Watson, which recognized an exception to the warrant 
requirement for arrests in public places.
59
 
The next Section addresses the Fourth Amendment warrant 
exceptions, beginning with Watson.  As that discussion makes clear, 
Watson does not support Justice Kennedy’s proposed justification for 
material witness warrants.  Neither does the other plausible warrant 
exception—for exigent circumstances—thus leaving witness detentions 
subject to the dictates of the special needs doctrine. 
B. WARRANT EXCEPTIONS 
Although the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has traditionally 
premised the constitutionality of a Fourth Amendment intrusion on a 
warrant, the Court has not hesitated in recognizing numerous exceptions to 
the warrant requirement.
60
  Aside from the special needs exception, which is 
analyzed in the following Part, neither of the other two credible 
 
57 al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2086 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
58 Id. 
59 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). 
60 See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (“Although the text of the 
Fourth Amendment does not specify when a search warrant must be obtained, this Court has 
inferred that a warrant must generally be secured . . .[,] subject to certain reasonable 
exceptions.”); City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) (“Although as a 
general matter, warrantless searches ‘are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,’ 
there are ‘a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions’ to that general rule.” 
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967))); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 
338 (2009) (“[O]ur analysis begins . . . with the basic rule that ‘searches conducted outside 
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are . . . unreasonable . . . 
subject only to a few . . . exceptions.’” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 357)).  But 
cf. TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 43, 47 (1969) 
(arguing that the Fourth Amendment was aimed primarily at oppressive warrants rather than 
warrantless searches and therefore that the warrant presumption “stood the amendment on its 
head”); Clancy, supra note 27, at 1034 (finding “little—if any—historical or modern support 
for creating a blanket warrant requirement”). 
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candidates—the exceptions for warrantless arrests and for exigent 
circumstances—supports the constitutionality of witness seizures. 
1. Warrantless Arrests 
United States v. Watson upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute 
allowing postal inspectors to make warrantless arrests in a public place if 
they had “reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has 
committed or is committing . . . a felony.”
61
  In support of its decision, the 
Court reasoned that the legislation in question was not “isolated or 
quixotic,” citing other comparable federal and state statutes as well as the 
“ancient” common law doctrine providing that warrantless felony arrests 
may be made in public based solely on probable cause.
62
  Notably, the 
Watson Court specified that by probable cause, it was expressly referring to 
“‘[t]he usual rule [allowing warrantless arrests of persons] believed by the 
officer upon reasonable cause to have been guilty of a felony.’”
63
  Watson 
therefore does not support any alteration in the traditional understanding of 
probable cause. 
Admittedly, the opinion in Watson relied on the “‘strong presumption 
of constitutionality due to an Act of Congress, especially when it turns on 
what is “reasonable”’”—a description that arguably applies to the federal 
material witness statute as well.
64
  Like the federal provision before the 
Court in Watson, the material witness statute is of longstanding duration 
and has analogues in every state.
65
  The existence of a statute, even one with 
a lengthy pedigree, does not absolve it from constitutional scrutiny, 
however.
66
  Moreover, the question whether these statutes historically 
 
61 18 U.S.C. § 3061(a)(3) (2006). 
62 Watson, 423 U.S. at 416, 418. 
63 Id. at 417 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925)); see also id. at 
419 (observing that “the prevailing rule” permits “‘a peace officer or a private citizen [to] 
arrest a felon without a warrant’” (quoting Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 504 (1885))); id. 
at 415 (noting that “there was probable cause in this case to believe that Watson had violated 
§ 1708”). 
64 Id. at 416 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 585 (1948)). 
65 Material witness statutes have their roots in sixteenth-century English law, and the 
federal legislation dates back to 1789.  See Carlson, supra note 23, at 944; Stacey M. 
Studnicki & John P. Apol, Witness Detention and Intimidation: The History and Future of 
Material Witness Law, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 483, 487–89 (2002).  Likewise, every state has 
a material witness statute, and most of them are more than a century old.  See In re Bacon, 
449 F.2d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 1971). 
66 See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978) (striking down a 
provision in the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (2006), that 
permitted warrantless safety inspections of business premises). 
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authorized the detention of a witness who had never refused to promise to 
appear is the subject of considerable dispute.
67
 
Additionally, nothing in Watson deviated from the Court’s standard 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which conditions the constitutionality of 
searches and seizures on both a warrant and traditional probable cause (or 
some well-established exception to those requirements).
68
  It is not entirely 
clear what Justice Kennedy meant by the reference in his al-Kidd 
concurrence to a “separate reasonableness requirement for seizures of the 
person,” and he did not quote or cite any particular portion of the Court’s 
ruling in Watson.
69
  The opinion in Watson did evaluate whether it was 
“reasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to recognize a 
warrant exception for arrests in public places,
70
 but in this sense it was no 
different from any Fourth Amendment decision addressing the 
constitutionality of a new exception to the warrant requirement, whether for 
seizures or for searches.
71
  A few recent Supreme Court opinions have used 
a general reasonableness-balancing rubric in a different way—to evaluate 
whether the Fourth Amendment was violated on the facts of the particular 
case—and those opinions are explored below in Part IV.  But Watson is not 
one of them.  Thus, Justice Kennedy’s al-Kidd concurrence 
notwithstanding, Watson did not turn on “a separate reasonableness 
requirement” and certainly not one distinctly pertaining to “seizures of the 
person.”  Watson therefore cannot be relied upon to provide a constitutional 
foundation for witness detentions. 
2. Exigent Circumstances 
Exigency has long been considered a justification for dispensing with a 
warrant, but not an exception to probable cause.  Thus, the fear that an 
individual may elude the police allows them to make a warrantless arrest, in 
the home, for example, but only if they also have probable cause to believe 
 
67 See, e.g., Bascuas, supra note 11, at 705 (describing the view that federal law has 
traditionally permitted the arrest of material witnesses as one based on “flawed history”); 
Cook, supra note 11, at 606–10 (surveying English and American common law and finding 
no support for the detention of material witnesses who did not refuse to comply with a 
subpoena). 
68 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
69 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2086 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
70 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415–17 (1976). 
71 See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (noting that “because the 
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement 
is subject to certain exceptions”). 
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that the individual committed a crime.
72
  Likewise, law enforcement 
officials may conduct a warrantless search to “‘prevent the imminent 
destruction of evidence,’”
73
 but only if they have probable cause to believe 
the evidence can be found in the place they are searching.
74
  Like Watson’s 
warrant exception for arrests, therefore, the exigent circumstances doctrine 
does not support an expansion of the traditional understanding of probable 
cause. 
Admittedly, as the Court recently observed in Kentucky v. King, its 
Fourth Amendment rulings have “identified several [types of] exigencies,”
75
 
some of which arise in situations where law enforcement officials have 
donned “the uniform of a firefighter” (or a paramedic) “rather than a 
policeman.”
76
  Thus, in Brigham City v. Stuart, for example, the Court 
concluded that the “emergency aid” exception allows police to make a 
warrantless entry into a home “to render emergency assistance to an injured 
occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.”
77
  Likewise, in 
Georgia v. Randolph, the Court indicated that police may enter a home 
without a warrant to protect a victim of domestic violence.
78
  But these 
cases involve “deviations from the typical police search”—i.e., from “the 
paradigmatic entry” for the criminal law enforcement purposes of arresting 
and searching for evidence.
79
  Rather, in these situations the police are 
conducting a regulatory or administrative search, which can only be 
justified under the special needs doctrine discussed in the next Part. 
 
72 See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984); United States v. Santana, 427 
U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976). 
73 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 
U.S. at 403). 
74 See, e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34–35 (1970). 
75 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856. 
76 Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978). 
77 Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403; see also Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546 (2009) (per 
curiam) (likewise applying the emergency aid doctrine). 
78 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 118 (2006).  In both Brigham City and Randolph, 
the Court used variations of the ambiguous phrase “reason to believe” in discussing the 
standard of exigency the prosecution must meet.  See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 400 (noting 
that the police may make a warrantless entry into a home if they have “an objectively 
reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened 
with such injury”); Randolph, 547 U.S. at 118 (observing that police may enter a home to 
protect a victim of domestic violence “so long as they have good reason to believe such a 
threat exists”).  For the view that terms like “reason to believe” muddle the concepts of 
probable cause and reasonable suspicion, see Kit Kinports, Diminishing Probable Cause and 
Minimalist Searches, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 649, 649–57 (2009). 
79 Tyler, 436 U.S. at 504–05. 
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To be sure, the Court’s opinion in Brigham City v. Stuart made an 
unconvincing attempt to distinguish the emergency aid doctrine at issue 
there from the administrative search cases—and it did so because the Court 
needed some justification for refusing to consider whether the police really 
entered the home “to assist the injured” or instead to “gather evidence.”
80
  
But in the single paragraph of the Brigham City opinion devoted to 
endorsing the emergency aid exception, the Court cited by way of support 
three of its precedents: two administrative search cases, Michigan v. Tyler 
and Mincey v. Arizona, and unsupported dictum from its two-month-old 
decision in Georgia v. Randolph.
81
  Tyler described “[a] burning building” 
as an “‘emergency situation[]’” that arises “in the regulatory field,” clearly 
distinguishing the administrative entry of the scene of a fire from the 
exigent circumstances exception available to “criminal law enforcement 
officials” who wish to enter without a warrant in order to effect an arrest or 
“prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.”
82
  Likewise, in Mincey the 
Court refused to permit a search to “gather evidence” at a homicide scene 
that went beyond “legitimate emergency activities.”
83
  And interestingly, 
Georgia v. Randolph, again in dictum, seemed to acknowledge the 
relevance of the police officer’s motives, referring to “[t]he undoubted right 
of the police to enter in order to protect a victim.”
84
  Therefore, despite the 
reasoning in Brigham City, the precedents on which the Court relied (in 
what Justice Stevens called “an odd flyspeck of a case”
85
) clearly 
recognized the analytical difference between criminal investigations and 
 
80 Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404.  The Court’s cursory discussion here suggested two 
possible arguments: that inquiries into motive are confined to “programmatic searches 
conducted without individualized suspicion,” and that such inquiries make no attempt to 
“discern[] what is in the mind of the individual officer conducting the search.”  Id. at 405.  
As discussed below, see infra notes 143–70 & 179–84 and accompanying text, neither of 
these purported distinctions accurately describes the administrative search precedents.  For 
further discussion of Brigham City’s refusal to acknowledge the relevance of police officer 
motives, see infra notes 163–70 and accompanying text. 
81 See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403 (citing Randolph, 547 U.S. at 118; Mincey v. 
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978); Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509). 
82 Tyler, 436 U.S. at 506, 512 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967)) 
(holding that police may make an administrative inspection of a fire scene if their “purpose 
is to ascertain the cause of a fire rather than to look for evidence of a crime,” but they need a 
warrant based on a “traditional showing of probable cause” to “gather evidence for a 
possible prosecution”). 
83 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 389, 393–95 (rejecting the state’s call for a “murder scene 
exception” to the warrant requirement). 
84 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 118–19 (emphasis added); see also id. at 121 (observing that 
police may not enter based on the consent of one co-tenant if they “removed” another 
occupant “for the sake of avoiding a possible objection” (emphasis added)). 
85 Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 407 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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Thus, the danger of losing a witness’s testimony may well be a type of 
exigency, but that does not give the government constitutional carte blanche 
to detain her.
87
  Assuming an absence of probable cause to believe the 
witness herself has committed a crime, which would trigger the exigent 
circumstances exception applicable in ordinary criminal law enforcement 
cases, the seizure must comply with the special needs doctrine described 
below.  Even the presence of the material witness warrant in al-Kidd—or a 
court order in a case like Camreta
88
—does not change this calculus because 
those warrants, like the probable cause on which they are based, are 
Camara-type warrants issued in special needs cases rather than traditional 
warrants.
89
  Thus, the only route to a constitutionally permissible detention 
of a witness, with or without a warrant, goes through the special needs 
doctrine.  That doctrine is the subject of the next Part. 
 
86 See also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (referring to “community 
caretaking functions” in connection with an administrative inventory search); 3 WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.6(b), at 86 (4th 
ed. Supp. 2010) (noting that it was “common” for lower courts applying the emergency aid 
doctrine prior to Brigham City to require that the “‘search must not be primarily motivated 
by intent to arrest and seize evidence’” (quoting 3 LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 6.6(b), at 454)). 
87 The complaints in al-Kidd and Camreta were dismissed prior to trial, and it is disputed 
whether “a genuine exigency” existed on the facts of either case.  Kentucky v. King, 131 S. 
Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011); see Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2086 (2011) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (noting that al-Kidd might have been “willing to testify if asked” and that the 
FBI may have “delay[ed] obtaining or executing the warrant until [he] arrived at the 
airport”); id. at 2087–88 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (pointing out that the 
affidavit submitted in support of the material witness warrant failed to reveal that al-Kidd’s 
“parents, wife, and children were all citizens and residents of the United States” and that al-
Kidd “had cooperated with FBI agents each of the several times they had asked to interview 
him,” and also “misrepresented that al-Kidd was about to take a one-way flight to Saudi 
Arabia, with a first-class ticket costing approximately $5,000 [when] in fact, al-Kidd had a 
round-trip, coach-class ticket that cost $1,700”); Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1030 
n.17 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding an absence of exigency given that the state officials waited to 
contact S.G. until three days after learning of her father’s release from jail and then sent her 
home following “the allegedly incriminating interview”), vacated as moot, 131 S. Ct. 2020 
(2011). 
88 See, e.g., Camreta, 588 F.3d at 1030 (deeming “a court order permitting the seizure of 
a child” to be “the equivalent of a warrant”). 
89 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
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III. “SPECIAL NEEDS” ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES 
Since its 1967 decision in Camara v. Municipal Court,
90
 the Supreme 
Court has recognized an exception to the traditional warrant requirement for 
administrative searches: regulatory inspections that have a “primary 
purpose” distinct from “the general interest in crime control,”
91
 i.e., that 
serve “‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.’”
92
  In 
order to pass constitutional scrutiny, these administrative searches must not 
only be motivated by a special need, but they must also survive a balancing 
test and must somehow limit the discretion of the individual inspectors.  
The Court’s opinions have fluctuated between treating discretion 
minimization as a separate hurdle that administrative inspections must clear 
or, instead, as one of the balancing factors considered in measuring the 
 
90 Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
91 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000). 
92 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 
U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment)).  The Court’s “special 
needs” construct has been subject to a good deal of criticism.  See, e.g., Clancy, supra note 
27, at 1022 n.298 (calling the Court’s special needs doctrine “formless,” “more a facade for 
policy results than an analytical framework supporting reasoned decisionmaking”); William 
J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 553, 554 (1992) (concluding that “the term turns out to be no more than a label that 
indicates when a lax standard will apply”).  Somewhat surprisingly, the al-Kidd majority 
referred to the “special-needs” and “administrative-search” cases as “[t]wo . . . ‘exceptions,’” 
and then went on to suggest that cases involving “vehicle checkpoints” may constitute yet 
another distinct analytical category.  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080–82 (2011) 
(quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001)).  The Court did not clearly 
define the difference it saw between administrative searches and special needs cases, though 
it may have viewed the former as searches and seizures “in execution of an administrative 
warrant,” and the latter as intrusions where “a judicial warrant and probable cause are not 
needed.”  Id. at 2081.  To be sure, al-Kidd was not the first opinion to suggest this 
distinction, although the Court has not shown much consistency here.  See Edmond, 531 U.S. 
at 37 (mentioning the three types of cases separately); Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 
496 U.S. 444, 449–50 (1990) (rejecting applicability of special needs doctrine in a 
checkpoint case); Brooks Holland, The Road ‘Round Edmond: Steering Through Primary 
Purposes and Crime Control Agendas, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 293, 297 n.20 (2006).  But cf. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45 (conflating the administrative search and special needs categories, 
and relying on both in evaluating a roadblock’s constitutionality).  Moreover, the Court has 
used similar tools to test the constitutionality of these various intrusions, and it therefore 
seems artificial to separate them.  See JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, 
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION § 18.05[A], at 312 (5th ed. 2010) 
(noting that “there is little or no reason for [any] distinction”).  But cf. Eve Brensike Primus, 
Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 260–61 (2011) (arguing 
that “the first step toward developing a coherent approach to administrative searches” is to 
recognize the difference between “dragnet intrusions” and “special subpopulation searches”). 
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intrusiveness of the search or seizure.
93
  Under either view, some restraint 
on discretion is a key consideration in special needs cases.  Although most 
of the Fourth Amendment intrusions in this line of cases involve searches, 
the special needs doctrine also encompasses seizures.
94
 
A. IDENTIFYING A SPECIAL NEED   
As an initial matter, then, the special needs exception does not come 
into play if law enforcement is engaged in an activity “whose primary 
purpose [is] to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”
95
  Thus, 
in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court disapproved of roadblocks that 
had a “primary purpose of interdicting illegal narcotics.”
96
  “When law 
 
93 See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452–53 (observing that “the guidelines governing 
checkpoint operation minimize the discretion of the officers on the scene,” and the 
checkpoint’s intrusiveness is diminished because its location is “selected pursuant to the 
guidelines, and uniformed police officers stop every approaching vehicle”); Skinner v. Ry. 
Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989) (relying on “the standardized nature of the 
[drug] tests and the minimal discretion vested in those charged with administering the 
program”); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703 (1987) (premising the constitutionality 
of an administrative inspection on “‘a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant’” so 
as to “limit the discretion of the inspecting officers” (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 
594, 602–03 (1980))); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 n.6, 376 n.7 (1987) (noting 
that “[o]ur decisions have always adhered to the requirement that inventories be conducted 
according to standardized criteria” in order to “circumscribe the discretion of individual 
officers”); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (calling the “assur[ance] that an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at 
the unfettered discretion of officers in the field” a “central concern”); Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (requiring a “substantial and objective standard or rule to govern 
the exercise of discretion,” and referring to “standardless and unconstrained discretion” as an 
“evil”); Camara, 387 U.S. at 532 (observing that a “disinterested party warrant” is needed 
for a housing inspection so as to avoid “leav[ing] the occupant subject to the discretion of the 
official in the field”). 
94 See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 422 (2004) (police set up a roadblock to inquire 
whether anyone had witnessed a recent hit-and-run and to distribute flyers seeking 
information about the accident). 
95 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38.  For criticism of the Court’s distinction between special needs 
and criminal law enforcement, see, e.g., Clancy, supra note 27, at 1025 (calling the line 
“illusory” and “unwise”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the 
Law-Abiding Public, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 87, 89 (referring to the distinction as “chimerical 
and irrelevant”).  But cf. Scott E. Sundby, Protecting the Citizen “Whilst He Is Quiet”: 
Suspicionless Searches, “Special Needs” and General Warrants, 74 MISS. L.J. 501, 551 
(2004) (linking the Court’s decision to take on a “judicial oversight” “role as an active 
‘policy magistrate’” in these cases to “the concerns over general warrants that gave rise to 
the Fourth Amendment”). 
96 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40; see also id. at 41 (distinguishing checkpoints “designed 
primarily to serve purposes closely related to the problems of policing the border or the 
necessity of ensuring roadway safety”). 
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enforcement authorities pursue primarily general crime control purposes at 
checkpoints,” the Court made clear, “stops can only be justified by some 
quantum of individualized suspicion.”
97
  Likewise, in Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston, the Court struck down a program to drug test pregnant women 
suspected of using cocaine because its “immediate objective” was to 
“generate evidence for law enforcement purposes” and therefore it was not 
“divorced from the State’s general interest in law enforcement.”
98
 
Seizing prospective witnesses for the purpose of conducting interviews 
or securing their testimony at trial is closely aligned with “the ordinary 
enterprise of investigating crimes,” and therefore seems to fall under 
Edmond and Ferguson.
99
  Even though government officials may not 
suspect the particular individual they are seizing, they are “collect[ing] 
evidence for criminal law enforcement purposes.”
100
  As a result, justifying 
these seizures under the “special needs” rubric appears problematic. 
Nevertheless, in Illinois v. Lidster, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a “brief, information-seeking” roadblock aimed at 
uncovering information about a recent hit-and-run accident in the 
vicinity.
101
  Distinguishing the drug interdiction checkpoint struck down in 
Edmond, the Court explained that the “primary law enforcement purpose” 
in Lidster was not to ascertain whether the “vehicle’s occupants were 
committing a crime,” but instead to ask them, “as members of the public, 
for their help in providing information about a crime in all likelihood 
committed by others.”
102
  That reasoning is equally applicable to other 
witness seizures, and given Lidster’s related point that “the phrase ‘general 
interest in crime control’ does not refer to every ‘law enforcement’ 
objective,” the Court could conceivably consider the “special need” 
 
97 Id. at 47. 
98 532 U.S. 67, 83, 79 (2001); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 
(1979) (concluding that “controlling automobile thefts” is not a special need). 
99 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44; see also id. at 40 (requiring an interest “distinct from a 
general purpose of investigating crime”). 
100 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83 n.20. 
101 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004). 
102 Id. at 423 (emphasis added); see also id. at 428 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (agreeing that “[t]here is a valid and important distinction between seizing 
a person to determine whether she has committed a crime and seizing a person to ask 
whether she has any information about an unknown person who committed a crime a week 
earlier”).  But cf. People v. Lidster, 747 N.E.2d 419, 423 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (observing that 
the presence of a second police officer “on a side street, apparently to prevent drivers from 
evading the roadblock . . . tends to discredit the explanation that the police were merely 
seeking information”), rev’d, Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004). 
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requirement satisfied in cases where witnesses were seized as part of an 
investigation into crimes “committed by others.”
103
 
On the other hand, the Lidster Court expended a great deal of energy 
justifying its refusal to apply “an Edmond-type presumptive rule of 
unconstitutionality” by citing factors peculiarly characteristic of police 
efforts to “seek[] information from the public” as opposed to the targeted 
seizure of specific witnesses—the brevity of the seizure, the reduced 
expectation of privacy in automobiles, and the fact that “by definition, the 
concept of individualized suspicion has little role to play.”
104
  None of these 
factors is a particularly apt description of the facts in Camreta or al-Kidd: 
even the seizure of S.G. lasted much longer than the ten- or fifteen-second 
stop in Lidster; the reduced expectation of privacy attached to vehicles was 
not implicated in either case; and the police were not casting a wide net but 
had zeroed in on S.G. and al-Kidd as potential witnesses.
105 
More importantly, support for restricting the reach of Lidster to law 
enforcement attempts “to obtain . . . information . . . from the motoring 
public” can be found in the Court’s comment that the exchange between 
police and drivers was “voluntary” after the initial “involuntary stop” at the 
checkpoint.
106
  Noting that officials investigating a crime can typically ask 
“members of the public” for assistance because such interactions generally 
do not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment “seizure,” the Lidster Court 
sought to avoid the “anomal[y]” of “ordinarily” permitting the police 
“freely to seek the voluntary cooperation of pedestrians” while “ordinarily” 
precluding them from “seek[ing] similar voluntary cooperation from 
motorists.”
107
  But the practical reality constraining both the police and the 
Court in Lidster—that the only way to “‘approach[]’” drivers and ask if 
 
103 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 423–24 (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44 n.1).  But cf. George M. 
Dery, III & Kevin Meehan, Making the Roadblock a “Routine Part of American Life:”  
Illinois v. Lidster’s Extension of Police Checkpoint Power, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 105, 118 
(2004) (taking the position that the Court “stopped short” of finding a special need in 
Lidster). 
104 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 424, 426. 
105 It is possible that Lidster’s reference to “individualized suspicion” instead meant that 
the concept has no place when it comes to witnesses because there is no reason to believe 
they themselves committed a crime.  That interpretation of Lidster, of course, undermines 
the al-Kidd majority’s suggestion that the term has a broader meaning.  See supra notes 53–
56 and accompanying text.  For additional discussion of different varieties of individualized 
suspicion, see infra notes 179–84 and accompanying text. 
106 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 422, 425–26 (emphasis added); see also id. at 425 (noting that 
“citizens will often react positively when police simply ask for their help as ‘responsible 
citizen[s]’ to ‘give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement’” (quoting 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477–78 (1966))). 
107 Id. at 425, 426. 
306 KIT KINPORTS [Vol. 102 
they are “‘willing to answer some questions’” is to “seize” them—applies 
only in cases where witnesses are on the road.
108
  Therefore, it requires an 
extension of Lidster to justify the involuntary detention of prospective 
witnesses like S.G. and al-Kidd, whose “voluntary cooperation” can be 
sought without seizing them.  And even if the Court is willing to read 
Lidster broadly, of course, the special need recognized there arises only 
when police “expect[]” the seizure of the witness “to help them apprehend 
. . . other individuals,” not the witness herself.
109
 
Cases like Camreta, where child witnesses are seized at school, can 
arguably be analogized to a different set of Supreme Court special needs 
decisions: those involving students.  In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court 
upheld the search of a student’s purse,
110
 and Board of Education v. Earls 
and Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton allowed schools to drug test 
students involved in extracurricular activities.
111
  But the “special need” 
found in those cases was tied—exclusively in T.L.O. and in part in the drug-
testing cases—to the school’s interest in “maintain[ing] order,” 
“discipline,” and “a proper educational environment.”
112
  Moreover, the 
searches in those cases were conducted exclusively by school personnel.  
Thus, in T.L.O. the Court pointed out that the search was not done “in 
 
108 Id. at 425 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983)).  For the definition of 
a Fourth Amendment “seizure,” see supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
109 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 423.  If the Court is serious about separating roadblock cases 
from other special needs and administrative searches, of course Lidster is even more easily 
distinguished from Camreta and al-Kidd.  See supra note 92. 
110 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985) (allowing school officials to search a 
student based on a reasonable suspicion that “the search will turn up evidence” showing that 
the student violated “either the law or the rules of the school”); see also Safford Unified Sch. 
Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2637, 2643 (2009) (interpreting T.L.O. to allow a search 
of a thirteen-year-old student’s backpack and outer clothing, but not a strip search, where she 
was suspected of bringing “forbidden prescription and over-the-counter drugs” to school). 
111 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002) (allowing drug testing of any student 
involved in “competitive extracurricular activities”); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 
U.S. 646, 664–65 (1995) (approving drug testing of student athletes). 
112 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, 342 n.9; see also Earls, 536 U.S. at 828–29 (expressing 
concern about “‘“unduly interfer[ing] with the maintenance of . . . swift and informal 
disciplinary procedures”’” (quoting Acton, 515 U.S. at 653 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340–
41))); Acton, 515 U.S. at 662 (observing that “the educational process is disrupted” at “a 
drug-infested school”); cf. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 28, Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (Nos. 09-1454, 09-1478) 
(arguing that child abuse can “impede the ability of that child, or of other children, to 
participate in school activities”). 
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conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies.”
113
  
Likewise, the Court emphasized in both drug-testing opinions that the test 
results were not used for law enforcement purposes or disclosed to the 
police.
114
  In each of those circumstances, the Court was therefore 
confidently able to state that the searches were “not in any way related to 
the conduct of criminal investigations.”
115
  This conclusion does not follow 
as readily when a suspected victim of child abuse is seized, particularly 
where the police are involved and the interview occurs in connection with 
an ongoing criminal investigation.
116
 
Although neither Lidster nor the school administrative search 
precedents are therefore controlling, a credible special need argument can 
nevertheless be made in both Camreta and al-Kidd.  Child safety and 
welfare is obviously an important governmental interest, and the interview 
in Camreta was conducted by a child protective services caseworker, 
though he was accompanied by a deputy sheriff.
117
  Likewise, in al-Kidd, 
 
113 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 n.7 (making clear that the Court was leaving open “the 
appropriate standard for assessing the legality of searches” in such cases and was addressing 
“only searches carried out by school authorities acting alone and on their own authority”). 
114 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833–34; Acton, 515 U.S. at 658 & n.2. 
115 Earls, 536 U.S. at 829. 
116 See Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1027 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding for this reason 
that “the presence of law enforcement objectives [was] evident”), vacated as moot, 131 S. 
Ct. 2020 (2011); see also Gates v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 
404, 424 (5th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a claim of special need because law enforcement officials 
participated in the search and its purpose was to investigate child abuse allegations); Jones v. 
Hunt, 410 F.3d 1221, 1228 (10th Cir. 2005) (limiting T.L.O. to seizures aimed at 
“preserv[ing] order on school property”); Roe v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory 
Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 407 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding that a social worker’s search was not 
justified by special need because child abuse investigations were “performed jointly with law 
enforcement agencies” and thus were “intimately intertwined with law enforcement”); Franz 
v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 791 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that a police officer’s “focus was not so 
much on the child as it was on the potential criminal culpability of her parents,” “the 
hallmark of a criminal investigation”).  But cf. Doe v. Bagan, 41 F.3d 571, 575 n.3 (10th Cir. 
1994) (applying T.L.O. in upholding a caseworker’s ten-minute school interview of a 
suspected child sex abuse victim); Wildauer v. Frederick Cnty., 993 F.2d 369, 372 (4th Cir. 
1993) (per curiam) (applying T.L.O. to a search conducted by a deputy sheriff in a child 
neglect investigation given the “noncriminal nature of [the] visit”); Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 
F.2d 893, 900–01 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying T.L.O. to a caseworker’s search in a child abuse 
and neglect case, and explaining that although criminal charges “may eventually result,” “the 
safety of the child” and “the stabilization of the home environment” are of “prime 
importance” to the caseworker). 
117 See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (pointing out that  
“prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective 
of surpassing importance”).  Child “health and safety” was also the predominant special need 
the Court relied on in the school drug-testing cases.  Earls, 536 U.S. at 834; see also id. at 
836–37 (“We know all too well that drug use carries a variety of health risks for children, 
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the government interest in keeping track of recalcitrant witnesses so as to 
protect the judicial process and facilitate accurate fact-finding at trial is 
arguably a goal distinct from ordinary criminal law enforcement.
118
 
B. PRIMARY V. ULTIMATE PURPOSE 
Nevertheless, the fact that the government’s “ultimate” objective—to 
protect children or the judicial process—may be “benign rather than 
punitive” is insufficient by itself to satisfy the requirement of a “special 
need” distinct from ordinary criminal law enforcement.
119
  As the Court 
noted in Ferguson, at some level all criminal law enforcement activity 
“serves some broader social purpose or objective.”
120
  It is therefore the 
“immediate,” “primary,” and “direct” goal that is of consequence, the Court 
cautioned, because otherwise “virtually any” police intrusion “could be 
immunized under the special needs doctrine.”
121
  The Court similarly 
concluded in Edmond that a “lawful secondary purpose” does not save a 
seizure primarily motivated by ordinary criminal law enforcement.
122
  Thus, 
 
including death from overdose.”); Acton, 515 U.S. at 661–62 (noting that “[s]chool years are 
the time when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most severe” 
and that “the risk of immediate physical harm . . . is particularly high” for athletes). 
118 See, e.g., al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (Bea, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that material witness warrants serve “the need to 
assure the proper functioning of the judicial system”), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011); 
Cochran, supra note 11, at 21 (observing that such warrants protect “the integrity of the 
criminal justice system”); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Material Witness Detentions After al-
Kidd, 100 KY. L.J. 293, 322 (2012) (reasoning that “the goal of material witness arrests . . . 
must be viewed as unrelated to the ordinary enforcement of criminal law, if subpoenas can 
. . . be issued without judicial supervision”). 
119 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 85 (2001); see also id. at 82–83 
(acknowledging that the “ultimate goal” of the city’s unconstitutional drug-testing program 
“may well have been to get the women in question into substance abuse treatment and off of 
drugs”). 
120 Id. at 84; see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 43 (2000) (likewise 
observing that “[t]he detection and punishment of almost any criminal offense serves broadly 
the safety of the community”). 
121 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83–84; see also Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42 (“If we were to rest 
the case at this high level of generality, there would be little check on the ability of the 
authorities to construct roadblocks for almost any conceivable law enforcement purpose.”).  
But cf. Ferguson, 532 U.S at 87 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority’s focus on 
immediate goals as contrary to the Court’s special needs precedents because “[b]y very 
definition, in almost every case the immediate purpose of a search policy will be to obtain 
evidence”).   
122 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46 (explaining that “[i]f this were the case . . . law enforcement 
authorities would be able to establish checkpoints for virtually any purpose so long as they 
also included a license or sobriety check”).  But see David H. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment 
Theory for Arrestee DNA and Other Biometric Databases, 15 U. PA. J. CON. L. (forthcoming 
 
2012] CAMRETA AND AL-KIDD 309 
the fact that the government may secondarily be interested in protecting 
children or the integrity of the judicial process cannot justify a witness 
detention primarily animated by law enforcement concerns.
123
 
But just as the government’s ability to link an intrusion to some 
noncriminal policy goal is not sufficient to establish a special need, it is not 
dispositive that a witness detention can lead to criminal charges because 
that possibility can arise in virtually any of the regulatory search contexts, 
whether a sobriety checkpoint,
124
 the inventory search of an automobile,
125
 
or even the housing inspection at issue in Camara.
126
  Likewise, law 
enforcement involvement is not necessarily fatal to a special needs 
argument.  The police staffed the sobriety and information-seeking 
roadblocks upheld in Sitz and Lidster,
127
 and, even more telling, conducted 
the inspection of the automobile junkyard in New York v. Burger.
128
  
Nevertheless, the Burger Court ascribed “no constitutional significance” to 
the fact that the search was performed by the police instead of 
“‘administrative’ agents.”
129
  Reasoning that police officers often have 
“numerous duties in addition to those associated with traditional police 
work” and that some communities may lack “the resources to assign the 
enforcement of a particular administrative scheme to a specialized agency,” 
the Court explained that the state had chosen to combat its “serious social 
 
2012) (manuscript at 25) (arguing that both Ferguson and Edmond were “single-motive 
cases involving single-purpose programs” and therefore that the Court’s “‘primary purpose’ 
language is dicta”), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2043259. 
123 These precedents therefore nicely counter one commentator’s objection that it would 
have been “illogical” for the al-Kidd Court to make it “easier to arrest a bystander than a 
suspected terrorist.”  Oliver, supra note 118, at 326, 337.  The government has a special 
needs justification for detaining both people assuming the primary purpose of the seizure is 
to secure their testimony at trial.  But just as it is easier to defend the constitutionality of a 
roadblock designed to “ensur[e] roadway safety” than one aimed at “interdicting illegal 
drugs,” so the administrative search exception more readily justifies the arrest of an 
“innocent” reluctant witness than one who is herself a suspected criminal.  Edmond, 531 
U.S. at 40–41.  See also infra notes 206–07 and accompanying text (describing Supreme 
Court precedent rejecting the argument that the government’s interest in investigating 
serious crimes triggers the special needs exception). 
124 See Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding sobriety 
checkpoint). 
125 See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (upholding inventory search that led to 
discovery of contraband). 
126 See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 531 (1967) (“Like most regulatory laws, 
fire, health, and housing codes are enforced by criminal processes.”). 
127 See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 422 (2004); Sitz, 496 U.S. at 447. 
128 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). 
129 Id. at 717. 
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problem in automobile theft” on multiple fronts, using “different subsidiary 
purposes and . . . different methods of addressing the problem.”
130
  The key, 
the Court thought, was whether the inspection of Burger’s property was 
“properly administrative”—i.e., whether the state was using the criminal 
laws to “punish[] [theft] or the possession of stolen property,” or instead 
was resorting to a separate “administrative,” “regulatory” scheme that was 
designed to “ensure that vehicle dismantlers are legitimate 
businesspersons,” to “‘mak[e] it unprofitable for persons to operate in the 
stolen car field,’” and to enable the prompt identification of “stolen vehicles 
and vehicle parts passing through automobile junkyards.”
131
  Likewise, in 
Ferguson, the Court was struck not by the mere involvement of the police 
in the drug-testing scheme, but by their “extensive” role “at every stage of 
the policy” and the fact that “the immediate objective of the searches was to 
generate evidence for law enforcement purposes.”
132
 
It may well be that, in cases like Camreta and al-Kidd, government 
officials are interested both in protecting children or the judicial process and 
in obtaining evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions.
133
  The Supreme 
Court has provided little guidance as to how courts are to untangle 
divergent motivations in these dual-purpose cases, and Edmond expressly 
left open the propriety of a checkpoint that was primarily designed to 
further a legitimate special need but also had “a secondary purpose of 
interdicting narcotics.”
134
  In Ferguson, however, the Court instructed 
judges to make a “‘close review,’” “consider[ing] all the available 
evidence,” in determining the primary purpose of a Fourth Amendment 
intrusion.
135
  Although the Court has acknowledged “the challenges 
 
130 Id. at 712, 713, 717. 
131 Id. at 713–14, 717 (quoting Letter of Stanley M. Gruss, Deputy Commissioner and 
Counsel, to Richard A. Brown, Counsel to the Governor (June 20, 1979), 1979 Bill Jacket); 
see also id. at 712–13 (“Administrative statutes and penal laws may have the same ultimate 
purpose of remedying [a] social problem, but . . . [a]n administrative statute . . . set[s] forth 
rules to guide an operator’s conduct of the business and allow[s] government officials to 
ensure that those rules are followed,” whereas “a major emphasis of [criminal laws] is the 
punishment of individuals for specific acts of behavior.”). 
132 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83–84 (2001) (emphasis added); see also 
id. at 83 n.20 (“None of the [Court’s] special needs cases have . . . upheld the collection of 
evidence for criminal law enforcement purposes.”). 
133 See Cochran, supra note 11, at 14 (commenting on the “potential for significant 
overlap” between witnesses and suspects); Coleman, supra note 24, at 491–92 (pointing out 
that “the majority of child welfare programs” are “arguably true dual-purpose schemes”). 
134 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 n.2 (2000). 
135 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997)); see 
also Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46 (likewise pointing out that “we examine the available evidence 
to determine the primary purpose of the checkpoint program”). 
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inherent in a purpose inquiry,” it pointed out in Edmond that “courts 
routinely engage in this enterprise in many areas of constitutional 
jurisprudence as a means of sifting abusive governmental conduct from that 
which is lawful.”
136
  The difficult judgment calls that arise in ascertaining 
motive are not confined to witness detention cases, or even to the special 
needs doctrine, and here, as elsewhere, courts have the tools to make them 
on a case-by-case basis.
137
 
In fact, one source of “available evidence” that can shed light on an 
officer’s motives is objective evidence.
138
  In cases where a material witness 
is arrested, for example, the length of the detention
139
 and the government’s 
efforts to depose the detainee or take other steps to preserve her 
testimony
140
 may help elucidate whether she is being held for the proper 
administrative purpose of securing her testimony or the impermissible law 
enforcement purpose of investigating her criminal culpability.  Moreover, 
the facility in which the detainee is housed and the conditions under which 
she is confined may also be relevant (assuming the authorities have some 
 
136 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46–47. 
137 See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 24, at 490–501 (analyzing these questions in the 
context of child welfare investigations); Holland, supra note 92, at 299–327 (discussing 
similar issues that arise with roadblocks). 
138 Cf. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507 (1978) (suggesting “relevant factors” to 
evaluate the permissibility of an entry to investigate a fire scene, including “[t]he number of 
prior entries, the scope of the search, the time of day when it is proposed to be made, [and] 
the lapse of time since the fire”). 
139 See Michael Greenberger, Indefinite Material Witness Detention Without Probable 
Cause: Thinking Outside the Fourth Amendment, in AT WAR WITH CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES 83, 107 (Thomas E. Baker & John F. Stack, Jr., eds. 2006) (finding a twenty-day 
detention under a material witness warrant “surprising[] and inexplicabl[e]”); cf. Holland, 
supra note 92, at 347 (noting that an “unreasonably extended sobriety inquiry” suggests that 
a DUI checkpoint “effectively has become a suspicionless criminal inquiry”). 
140 The federal material witness statute prohibits the arrest of a material witness on the 
grounds of “inability to comply with any condition of release” if her testimony “can 
adequately be secured by deposition, and if further detention is not necessary to prevent a 
failure of justice,” and further provides that “release . . . may be delayed for a reasonable 
period of time until the deposition can be taken.”  18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006).  The Senate 
Report accompanying the 1984 amendments to the Bail Reform Act “stresse[d] that 
whenever possible, the deposition of such witnesses should be obtained so that they may be 
released from custody.”  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 28 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182, 3211.  For the view that material witnesses should not be detained if the prosecution 
can depose them, see, e.g., Carlson, supra note 23, at 955; Cook, supra note 11, at 586–87.  
But cf. Oliver, supra note 118, at 336–37 (noting that the statute articulates “no criteria” for 
courts to use in evaluating “the government’s need for live as opposed to transcribed 
testimony”). 
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choice in these matters).
141
  Finally, and most important, is the nature of the 
interrogation questions asked of her––whether they focus on her knowledge 
of crimes committed by others or her own suspected criminal activity.
142
  
Similarly, relevant objective factors in a case like Camreta are the location, 
tone, and length of the interview; the identities of the interrogator and 
others in the room; and the kinds of questions asked.  This type of objective 
evidence can help alleviate the difficulties that arise in ascertaining the 
primary motive underlying a witness detention, especially in a dual-purpose 
case. 
It remains to consider whose motive or purpose is dispositive in 
making these judgments.  The next Section takes up that issue. 
C. PROGRAMMATIC V. INDIVIDUAL PURPOSE 
The Supreme Court has admonished that “the purpose inquiry” in 
special needs cases should be “conducted only at the programmatic level 
and is not an invitation to probe the minds of individual officers acting at 
the scene.”
143
  Picking up on this language, Ashcroft argued in al-Kidd that 
the focus ought to be on Congress’s purpose in passing the federal material 
witness statute, not the allegedly pretextual intentions of the former 
Attorney General or the federal agents who obtained the material witness 
warrant authorizing al-Kidd’s arrest.
144
  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in 
 
141 See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2089 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (noting that al-Kidd’s claims relating to “the brutal conditions of his confinement” 
had been settled, “[b]ut his ordeal is a grim reminder of the need to install safeguards against 
disrespect for human dignity”); al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(observing that “when, as here, the government is empowered to detain those who are not 
charged with crimes, it is under an obligation not to treat them like criminals”), rev’d, 131 S. 
Ct. 2074 (2011); Oliver, supra note 118, at 315–16 (reporting that New York City built a 
“separate facility” in the mid-nineteenth century so that material witnesses “would not 
languish in the same condition as pre-trial detainees and convicted misdemeanants”); cf. 
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 717 (1987) (pointing out that limited resources may 
constrain governments). 
142 Cf. Holland, supra note 92, at 346 (arguing that “[w]hether the police 
programmatically assigned disparate checkpoint resources to crime control inquiries . . . 
objectively may reveal whether the checkpoint was ‘primarily’ a sobriety checkpoint”). 
143 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) (citing Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)); see also Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 405 (2006) 
(observing that the “special needs” inquiry examines “the purpose behind the program” and 
“has nothing to do with” the intent of the individual officer who performed the search).  For 
criticism of this distinction, see Clancy, supra note 27, at 1026 (calling the line drawn by the 
Court “ironic” given that the writs of assistance and general warrants animating the Fourth 
Amendment were “suspicionless intrusions approved of at the programmatic level”). 
144 Brief for Petitioner at 35, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011) (No. 10-98); 
see also al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (Bea, J., concurring in part 
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Camreta undertook a “review of Oregon’s statutory scheme” in rejecting 
the state’s assertion of a special need in that case.
145
 
This programmatic focus makes sense when a constitutional challenge 
is leveled at the administrative program as a whole—for example, cases 
attacking the federal material witness statute itself, the roadblocks set up in 
Edmond, Lidster, and Sitz, or the drug-testing policies at issue in Ferguson 
and the school cases.  It even makes sense when one particular Fourth 
Amendment intrusion is challenged and the officials involved were 
following procedures established by those who set up the administrative 
scheme––if, for example, a suspected victim of child sexual abuse was 
questioned in conformity with state child welfare laws mandating that 
caseworkers and police officers interview children together as part of a 
multidisciplinary approach to child abuse.
146
  In either of these 
circumstances, a finding that the program’s primary purpose was divorced 
from ordinary criminal law enforcement suffices to ensure that the intrusion 
in question was justified by a special need.
147
 
On the other hand, when issues arise concerning the constitutionality 
of a particular search or seizure that was not dictated by regulatory 
procedures, when individual government actors are afforded discretion in 
implementing the administrative scheme, an evaluation of programmatic 
purpose is not sufficient to prevent criminal law enforcement intrusions 
masquerading as special needs searches or seizures.  As the Court explained 
in Michigan v. Tyler, the constitutionality of an overall regulatory scheme, 
such as “routine building inspections,” can be assessed by examining 
 
and dissenting in part) (arguing that “the relevant inquiry is not into the motivations of 
individual officers who obtained and executed the particular warrant on which al-Kidd was 
detained, but into the ‘programmatic purpose’ that provides the constitutional justification 
for the material witness statute”), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).  But see id. at 969 (majority 
opinion) (concluding that the focus should be on the “general policy, designed and 
implemented by Ashcroft, whose programmatic purpose was not to secure testimony, but to 
investigate those detained”). 
145 Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1028 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated as moot, 131 S. Ct. 
2020 (2011); see also Brief for Petitioner James Alford at 28–32, Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. 
Ct. 2020 (2011) (No. 09-1478) (engaging in a similar inquiry).  But see Brief for 
Respondents at 70, Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (Nos. 09-1454, 09-1478) 
(disputing existence of special need by citing Deputy Sheriff Alford’s admission that his 
presence at S.G.’s interview was for law enforcement purposes). 
146 See Coleman, supra note 24, at 492–95 (describing such statutory schemes). 
147 Cf. Holland, supra note 92, at 300 (noting that “[s]uspicionless checkpoints are 
evaluated at a programmatic level because . . . the program, not individual officer discretion, 
controls the checkpoint’s execution” and therefore “the purpose inquiry properly is limited to 
the program itself”). 
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“broad legislative or administrative guidelines.”
148
  By contrast, for 
administrative searches that “are not programmatic” but instead are 
“responsive to individual events,” such as the fire investigations at issue in 
Tyler, the Court cautioned that “a more particularized inquiry may be 
necessary” to “prevent[] harassment” and ensure that inspectors are not 
impermissibly “look[ing] for evidence of a crime.”
149
  In the latter scenario, 
there is no real question surrounding any “program” per se, and the 
purposes of the “individual officers acting at the scene” must become an 
appropriate subject of scrutiny.
150
  Otherwise, government officials are 
given an opportunity to circumvent the limitations on special needs 
intrusions and impermissibly use them for purposes of routine criminal law 
enforcement. 
Admittedly, in discussing automobile inventory searches in Colorado 
v. Bertine, the Court indicated that an administrative regime may afford 
some discretion to individual police officers, “so long as that discretion is 
exercised according to standard criteria.”
151
  But the Court cautioned that 
the officer’s actions must also be based on “something other than suspicion 
of evidence of criminal activity.”
152
  Moreover, it took pains to point out 
that there was “no showing that the police chose to impound Bertine’s van 
in order to investigate suspected criminal activity,”
 
thus confirming the 
importance of this individualistic focus when government officials have 
discretion to choose, for example, to inspect a fire scene, inventory a car, or 
detain a prospective witness.
153
 
Support for the dichotomous approach proposed here can be found in 
the Whren line of cases as well as the Supreme Court’s special needs 
jurisprudence.  The Whren opinion itself specifically discussed special 
needs precedents that analyzed the motives of the officials conducting the 
inspections to make sure they were not engaged in a pretextual search for 
evidence.
154
  In explaining why an officer’s “ulterior motive” was relevant 
 
148 Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507 (1978) (identifying “the purpose, frequency, 
scope, and manner of conducting the inspections” as relevant considerations). 
149 Id. at 507–08. 
150 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000). 
151 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987). 
152 Id. at 375. 
153 Id. at 376; see also id. at 374 (finding that the “inventory procedures [were] 
administered in good faith”). 
154 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811–12 (1996) (quoting Florida v. Wells, 
495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (“‘[A]n inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in 
order to discover incriminating evidence.’”); Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372 (“[T]here had been ‘no 
showing that the police, who were following standardized procedures [in inventorying a 
vehicle], acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation.’”); New York v. Burger, 
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in that context, the Whren Court reasoned—in language later echoed in al-
Kidd
155
—that these opinions “simply explain that the exemption from the 
need for probable cause (and warrant), which is accorded to searches made 
for the purpose of inventory or administrative regulation, is not accorded to 
searches that are not made for those purposes.”
156
  And in al-Kidd itself, the 
Court likewise pointed out that the special needs and administrative search 
exceptions “do not apply where the officer’s purpose is not to attend to the 




As both Whren and al-Kidd confirmed, and as reflected in the 
discussion above of Michigan v. Tyler and Colorado v. Bertine, the Court’s 
special needs decisions have considered the motivations of individual 
government officials.  For example, in rejecting the contention that the 
inspection of the junkyard in New York v. Burger “had no truly 
administrative purpose,” the Court first examined the statute’s general 
structure and concluded that the state legislature “had proper regulatory 
purposes for enacting the administrative scheme and was not using it as a 
‘pretext’ to enable law enforcement authorities to gather evidence of penal 
law violations.”
158
  But the Court then went on to make clear that the search 
of Burger’s property was conducted “solely pursuant to the administrative 
scheme,” such that there was “no reason to believe that the instant 
inspection was actually a ‘pretext’ for obtaining evidence” of a crime.
159
 
Likewise, in Lidster, the Court observed that in setting up the 
roadblock, “[t]he police expected the information elicited to help them 
apprehend, not the vehicle’s occupants, but other individuals.”
160
  But the 
Court also thought it important to point out that there was “no allegation 
here that the police acted in a discriminatory or otherwise unlawful manner 
while questioning motorists during stops.”
161
  Most recently, in City of 
Ontario v. Quon, the Court concluded that the search of a city employee’s 
text messages was based on a permissible “‘noninvestigatory work-related 
purpose,’” given the specific reasons why the chief of police “ordered the 
 
482 U.S. 691, 716–17 n.27 (1987) (“[T]he search did not appear to be ‘a “pretext” for 
obtaining evidence of . . . violation of . . . penal laws.’”)). 
155 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011). 
156 Whren, 517 U.S. at 811–12. 
157 al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2081 (emphasis added). 
158 Burger, 482 U.S. at 712. 
159 Id. at 716 n.27 (emphasis added). 
160 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423 (2004). 
161 Id. at 428 (emphasis added). 
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search.”
162
  Thus, the special needs decisions, and their treatment in the 
Whren line of cases, support consideration of the subjective motivations of 
individual government actors who are given discretion to choose to seize a 
prospective witness. 
Once again, however, that “odd flyspeck of a case,” Brigham City v. 
Stuart, rears its head.
163
  As discussed above, the Court’s cursory discussion 
of the emergency aid doctrine in that decision refused to recognize that 
police entries to help injured persons fall within the special needs realm.
164
  
In fact, the Brigham City Court distinguished the administrative search 
cases and found Whren controlling, concluding that “the individual officer’s 
state of mind” was “irrelevant” and therefore it did “not matter . . . whether 
the officers entered the kitchen to arrest . . . and gather evidence . . . or to 
assist the injured and prevent further violence.”
165
  But entries to provide 
emergency aid, like entries to investigate the cause of a fire, are 
constitutional only when the officers’ “purpose is . . . to attend to the special 
needs,”
166
 and not when they conduct “searches that are not made for those 
purposes,” such as searches for evidence.
167
  Therefore, the Court erred in 
applying Whren and denying the relevance of a police officer’s subjective 
motivation in a special needs case like Brigham City.  And to the extent the 
Brigham City Court was troubled by the difficulties involved in “neatly 
unravel[ing]” an individual official’s subjective purpose
168
 or was 
sympathetic to the fear that allowing an inquiry into an individual officer’s 
 
162 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2631 (2010) (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 
480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987)) (explaining that the police chief “ordered the search in order to 
determine whether the character limit on the City’s contract with [the company that supplied 
its pagers] was sufficient to meet the City’s needs”); see also Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 
287, 292 (1984) (plurality opinion) (observing that the constitutionality of a fire inspection 
turns on “whether the object of the search is to determine the cause of the fire or to gather 
evidence of criminal activity”). 
163 Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 349, 407 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
164 See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text. 
165 Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404–05; see also Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 548 
(2009) (per curiam) (noting that the “‘emergency aid exception’ does not depend on the 
officers’ subjective intent or the seriousness of any crime they are investigating when the 
emergency arises,” but instead “requires only ‘an objectively reasonable basis for believing’ 
that ‘a person within [the house] is in need of immediate aid’” (quoting Brigham City, 547 
U.S. at 404–05, 406; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978))). 
166 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2081 (2011). 
167 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996). 
168 Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 405; see also Cochran, supra note 11, at 30–31 (predicting 
that “determin[ing] ‘pretext’ on a case-by-case basis” will be “extremely difficult” and 
“fraught with problematic possibilities” given that “it is highly unlikely that [a future] 
Attorney General will announce a department-wide policy of using the material witness 
statute to detain terrorist suspects”). 
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subjective motivation will eviscerate Whren,
169
 relying on the objective 
evidence described above can help assuage those concerns.
170
 
D. WARRANTS, INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION, AND OTHER 
DISCRETION-LIMITING DEVICES 
In addition to distinguishing programmatic and individual purposes, 
Brigham City cited a second rationale in its attempt to avoid the purpose 
inquiry mandated by the administrative search cases, and it is one the Court 
picked up on in al-Kidd: that evaluations of motive are confined to 
“programmatic searches conducted without individualized suspicion.”
171
  
As noted above, the al-Kidd Court rightly acknowledged that a Fourth 
Amendment intrusion allegedly conducted for administrative purposes is 
invalid if actually motivated by an impermissible investigative purpose.
172
  
Nonetheless, al-Kidd found the special needs and administrative inspections 
cases—and therefore an “invalidating-purpose inquiry”—irrelevant in that 
case for two reasons: first, because the Government “seeks to justify [al-
Kidd’s] arrest on the basis of a properly issued judicial warrant,” and, 
second, picking up where Brigham City left off, because that warrant was 
“based on individualized suspicion.”
173
  Contrary to the Court’s suggestion, 
however, neither an administrative warrant nor individualized suspicion 
excuses the failure to require proof of a permissible purpose under the 
special needs doctrine. 
It is not the warrant itself, of course, that immunizes a search from 
constitutional scrutiny.  Even a traditional warrant can be lacking in 
probable cause or fail the particularity requirements.
174
  More important, the 
existence of a warrant does not take a Fourth Amendment intrusion outside 
the administrative inspection doctrine.  Some regulatory searches—like the 
housing inspections in Camara and the non-emergency fire investigations 
in Tyler—are based on warrants, though not, of course, a traditional search 
warrant based on individualized probable cause.
175
  The critical 
 
169 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011) 
(No. 10-98) (Chief Justice Roberts voices concern that “the allegation can so readily be 
made in every case under the material witness statute . . . that this is one of those bad intent 
cases, and the case has to proceed so that we can prove that”). 
170 See supra notes 138–42 and accompanying text. 
171 Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 405. 
172 al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2081, 2083. 
173 Id. at 2081, 2082. 
174 See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557–58 (2004); United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 923 (1984). 
175 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
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constitutional inquiry in cases involving warrants—both traditional and 
administrative ones—is, as the al-Kidd Court recognized, whether the 
warrant was “properly issued.”
176
  In the administrative search context, a 
warrant is “properly issued” only if it is justified by a special need distinct 
from ordinary criminal law enforcement.  Thus, an administrative warrant 
to search the scene of a fire is “properly issued” only to investigate the 
cause of the fire and not to search for evidence of arson or some other 
crime.
177
  Likewise, a material witness warrant can be “properly issued” 
only to secure the testimony of a witness and not to detain a suspect.
178
  If 
the primary motivation underlying the arrest is the ordinary criminal law 
enforcement purpose of neutralizing a suspect, then the warrant is not 
properly issued under the special needs doctrine.  Thus, the al-Kidd 
majority erred by suggesting that the material witness warrant obviated a 
purpose inquiry. 
Echoing Brigham City, the al-Kidd Court additionally distinguished 
Edmond and Ferguson on the ground that at issue in each of those cases 
was “a general scheme of searches without individualized suspicion.”
179
  
But, as discussed above in Part II.A, under the traditional understanding of 
the term “individualized suspicion”—reason to believe a suspect committed 
a crime—such suspicion was absent in al-Kidd as well.  Individualized 
suspicion of criminal activity justifies a stop or arrest, including, according 
 
176 al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2081. 
177 See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511–12 (1978). 
178 See, e.g., Bascuas, supra note 11, at 736 (decrying the “roundup of innocents” under 
material witness statutes); Carlson, supra note 23, at 971, 975 (arguing that material witness 
warrants should be not used as a “ruse” to seize and question suspects, and that government 
should not be permitted to do an “end-run around critical steps in criminal procedure simply 
by labeling the arrestee a ‘witness’”); Studnicki & Apol, supra note 65, at 486 (calling 
“investigatory detentions” of witnesses a “misuse” of material witness laws).  But cf. Wesley 
MacNeil Oliver, The Rise and Fall of Material Witness Detention in Nineteenth Century 
New York, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 727, 729 (2005) (finding that, “as a practical matter, the 
power to detain witnesses has never been used any other way”); Carolyn B. Ramsey, In the 
Sweat Box: A Historical Perspective on the Detention of Material Witnesses, 6 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 681, 685 (2009) (concluding that suspects have been detained as material witnesses 
since the nineteenth century and the “dichotomy between innocent witness and the criminal 
suspect . . . rarely existed”). 
179 al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2081 n.1; see also id. at 2082 (“The existence of a judicial 
warrant based on individualized suspicion takes this case outside the domain of not only our 
special-needs and administrative-search cases, but of Edmond as well.”); Oliver, supra note 
118, at 312 (similarly reasoning that “[t]he ‘special needs’ cases . . . do not provide a ready 
analogy to the detention of material witnesses” because “[t]he witness’s seizure and 
detention is far from random”). 
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to Edmond, a stop at a narcotics checkpoint.
180
  In such cases, however, as 
the Court made clear in Edmond, government officials are “pursu[ing] 
primarily general crime control purposes.”
181
  They are not acting under the 
special needs doctrine, and it is for that reason that no inquiry into purpose 
is called for. 
When officials act, however, based on other varieties of individualized 
suspicion—“reasonable grounds for suspecting” that a student is violating 
school rules,
182 
or “reasonable suspicion that [a] driver is unlicensed or his 
vehicle unregistered”
183
—they are wearing their administrative hats and 
therefore must comply with the special needs doctrine.  Cases like al-Kidd, 
where, as the Court put it, the FBI had “individualized reasons to believe 
that [al-Kidd] was a material witness and that he would soon disappear,” are 
no different.
184
  Without individualized suspicion that al-Kidd himself had 
committed a crime, the government must rely on a special needs rationale to 
arrest him.  At that point, the “purpose inquiry” becomes relevant, and it 
cannot be avoided by a showing of individualized suspicion (or even a 
warrant). 
In administrative inspection cases, individualized suspicion or a 
warrant does a nice job of placing limits on the discretion of the officials 
conducting the search or seizure.  But neither one replaces the separate 
requirement that the intrusion be justified by some government interest 
distinct from ordinary criminal law enforcement.
185
  The special need 
finding ensures that the government interest suffices to bypass the 
traditional probable cause and warrant required in ordinary criminal law 
enforcement cases.  Administrative warrants and individualized suspicion—
 
180 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000) (“When law enforcement 
authorities pursue primarily general crime control purposes at checkpoints . . . , stops can 
only be justified by some quantum of individualized suspicion.”). 
181 Id. 
182 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985). 
183 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979). 
184 al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2082. 
185 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702–03 (1987) (listing the separate hurdles 
that an administrative inspection must clear, and requiring both a “‘substantial’ government 
interest that informs the regulatory scheme” and “‘a constitutionally adequate substitute for a 
warrant’” (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602–03 (1980))).  Conflating these 
two requirements, the dissenting Ninth Circuit opinion in al-Kidd thus erred in citing 
Burger’s reference to a “constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant” to support the 
conclusion that the issuance of a material witness warrant for al-Kidd meant “there is simply 
no need to inquire into the government’s ‘programmatic purpose.’”  al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 
F.3d 949, 986–87 (9th Cir. 2009) (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev’d, 
131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011); see also supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text (explaining the 
distinct requirements an administrative search must satisfy). 
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like other mechanisms used in the regulatory context to minimize the 
discretion exercised by government actors
186
—serve two additional 
functions.  They protect against the arbitrary exercise of discretion,
187
 and 
they reduce the intrusiveness of the search or seizure by reassuring the 
individual involved that the infringement on her privacy “is being made 
pursuant to the law and has a properly defined scope.”
188
  Thus, the al-Kidd 
majority was wrong to suggest that either a material witness warrant or 
individualized suspicion directed at al-Kidd (but not tied to his own 
suspected wrongdoing) excused the Court from inquiring whether a 
material witness warrant was obtained in that case primarily to investigate 
al-Kidd’s suspected terrorist activities. 
It is conceivable, however, that the al-Kidd Court would reach the 
same destination via a different route.  Given the majority’s assumption that 
al-Kidd conceded the validity of the material witness warrant used to arrest 
him,
189
 the Court did not evaluate whether the FBI had the requisite 
probable cause to believe that al-Kidd had “material” testimony to offer in 
“a criminal proceeding” and that it might “become impracticable to secure 
[his] presence . . . by subpoena.”
190
  Four of the Justices—Justice Kennedy 
and the three who joined Justice Ginsburg’s separate opinion—did not seem 
 
186 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
187 See Burger, 482 U.S. at 703 (observing that “‘a constitutionally adequate substitute 
for a warrant’ . . . must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers” (quoting Donovan, 452 
U.S. at 603)); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654–55 (noting that in the absence of “‘some quantum of 
individualized suspicion,’ other safeguards are generally relied upon to assure that the 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not ‘subject to the discretion of the official 
in the field’” (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967))). 
188 Burger, 482 U.S. at 703; see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 
621–22 (1989) (noting that a warrant “protect[s] privacy interests by assuring citizens 
subject to a search or seizure . . . that the intrusion is authorized by law, and that it is 
narrowly limited in its objectives and scope”); Camara, 387 U.S. at 532 (requiring an 
administrative warrant for housing inspections because otherwise “the occupant has no way 
of knowing whether enforcement of the municipal code . . . requires inspection of his 
premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector’s power to search, and no 
way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper authorization”). 
189 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
190 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006).  See In re Bacon, 449 F.2d 933, 943 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(interpreting the federal material witness statute to condition issuance of a warrant on 
“probable cause to believe (1) ‘that the testimony of a person is material’ and (2) ‘that it may 
become impracticable to secure his presence by subpoena’” (quoting an earlier version of the 
federal statute)); see also Bascuas, supra note 11, at 716, 703 (noting that Bacon has been 
“uncritically adopted” by other federal courts and cited by Congress as the “exclusive legal 
authority for the statute”). 
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confident that these requirements were met on the facts of al-Kidd,
191
 and 
the Government conceded that the statutory prerequisites would not likely 
be satisfied in a case involving a witness prosecutors had no intention of 
calling.
192
  But even if the Court’s approach would eventually reach these 
questions in the context of assessing whether a warrant was supported by 
probable cause, its opinion in al-Kidd erred by conflating administrative 
and ordinary criminal law enforcement intrusions and by implying that a 
warrant and individualized suspicion take a case out of the special needs 
doctrine.  Doctrinal consistency therefore calls for considering these issues 
as part of a special needs analysis, as proposed here. 
E. SPECIAL NEEDS BALANCING   
Finally, assuming a special need divorced from ordinary criminal law 
enforcement and some mechanism in place to cabin the discretion of the 
individual officials making the seizure, the detention of a witness will pass 
constitutional scrutiny under the Court’s special needs cases only if it 
survives a balancing test that weighs “the need to [seize] against the 
invasion which the [seizure] entails.”
193
  The discussion of the Court’s 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness balancing cases in Part IV also 
addresses the relevant countervailing interests, but it is important for our 
purposes here to highlight some of the considerations that have influenced 
the Court in other circumstances where it has applied a balancing test to 
administrative inspections. 
In rejecting Fourth Amendment challenges in such cases, the Court has 
often been able to cite the reduced expectation of privacy enjoyed by the 
individuals subjected to the search or seizure—because, for example, they 
 
191 See supra note 87; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 169, at 39 
(Justice Kennedy suggests that claims of pretextual material witness arrests can “be resolved 
under the issue of materiality”); Oliver, supra note 118, at 295–96, 299 (describing the 
affidavit submitted in support of the warrant for al-Kidd’s arrest as “remarkably short” and 
“conclusory,” and concluding that “no federal judge should have issued such a warrant”). 
192 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 169, at 15 (admitting that a 
“prosecutor[’s] subjective intent” not to call a witness “will almost always reflect the fact 
that materiality just objectively hasn’t been met” in that case); Reply Brief for Petitioner at 
15–16, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011) (No. 10-98) (acknowledging that “it 
would be likely that at least one of the objective requirements of the statute was not 
satisfied” if the prosecutor told the magistrate she did not intend to use a witness’s 
testimony, although claiming that the prosecutor’s “subjective intent . . . would not be 
relevant to the magistrate’s inquiry”). 
193 Camara, 387 U.S. at 536–37.  Given this balancing inquiry, it is not obvious, as one 
commentator has asserted, that treating “the interest in securing witnesses . . . like other 
special needs” would allow “only a de minimis intrusion on a citizen’s liberty.”  Oliver, 
supra note 118, at 314. 
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have chosen to operate a business in a “closely regulated” industry,
194
 to 
take part in extracurricular activities,
195
 or to accept a particular job.
196
  
Witnesses and victims cannot be said to have made any such choices, 
however.  The Court has also indicated that children like S.G. have a 
diminished expectation of privacy at school,
197
 but that argument may carry 




Another factor the Court has taken into account in measuring the 
severity of the privacy infringement in special needs cases is the 
intrusiveness of the government action, “[v]iewed [both] objectively” and 
“subjectively.”
199
  Relevant considerations in assessing objective 
intrusiveness in witness detention cases are the length of the seizure
200
 and 
the sensitivity of the information sought from the detainee,
201
 as well as the 
use to which the information is put.
202
  Subjective intrusiveness turns on the 
 
194 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987); see also, e.g., United States v. 
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (“When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively 
regulated business and to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his 
business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection.”). 
195 See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 831–32 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995). 
196 See Treasury Emps. v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 671–72 (1989) (upholding drug 
testing of Customs Service employees who sought certain positions); Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624–25, 627 (1989) (allowing drug testing of railroad 
employees who were involved in a major accident or violated certain safety rules); cf. 
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) (noting that the pregnant women 
tested there had the same high expectation of privacy “enjoyed by the typical patient”).  But 
cf. Schulhofer, supra note 95, at 88 (finding it “bizarre” that under the administrative search 
doctrine, “the law-abiding public . . . fare[s] worse, than those whose criminal activities 
prompt traditional police searches and seizures”). 
197 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 830–31; Acton, 515 U.S. at 654–57. 
198 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
199 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427–28 (2004). 
200 See id. at 427 (noting that “[c]ontact with the police lasted only a few seconds”); 
Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (referring to the checkpoint 
as a “brief stop”). 
201 See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 428 (observing that “[p]olice contact consisted simply of a 
request for information and the distribution of a flyer”); see also, e.g., City of Ontario v. 
Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2631 (2010) (explaining, in finding that a city’s review of text 
messages sent on an employee’s “employer-provided pager” was not overly intrusive, that 
there was a reduced “risk that the review would intrude on highly private details of [the 
employee’s] life”); Acton, 515 U.S. at 658–59 (deeming it “significant that the tests at issue 
here look only for drugs, and not for whether the student is . . . epileptic, pregnant, or 
diabetic,” and finding “some cause for concern” because students were required to disclose 
their prescription medications). 
202 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833–34; Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 
(2001); Acton, 515 U.S. at 658–59 & n.2. 
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extent to which the seizure generates “anxiety or alarm”
203
 or involves 
singling out a particular individual, factors that seem to lean toward the 
detainee’s side of the scale in cases like Camreta and al-Kidd.
204
 
In balancing the government interests on the other hand, no one can 
doubt the importance of terrorism and child sexual abuse investigations.  By 
way of comparison, Lidster described the public interest at issue in a hit-
and-run case as “grave” because the “crime had resulted in a human 
death.”
205
  Nevertheless, the Court has also made clear that the special 
needs exception is not triggered simply by the “severe and intractable 
nature” of a particular social problem,
206
 given that “the same can be said of 
various other illegal activities.”
207
  Likewise, law enforcement officials 
obviously encounter obstacles in pursuing suspected terrorists and child 
molesters, but that is also true of other criminal investigations.
208
  Despite 
the public interests implicated in witness seizure cases, therefore, the 
unavailability of a reduced expectation of privacy argument makes the 
government’s ability to prevail in a balancing test problematic, especially if 
the seizure is particularly intrusive. 
 
203 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 428; see also Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 
2633, 2641 (2009) (relying on the “embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating” nature of a 
strip search, and pointing out that “adolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent 
intrusiveness of the exposure”); Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452 (weighing “the fear and surprise 
engendered in law-abiding motorists by the nature of the stop”); Coleman, supra note 24, at 
488–89 (observing that the Court considers how “stigmatizing” and “demeaning” the 
government action was). 
204 See, e.g., Lidster, 540 U.S. at 428 (noting that there “[t]he police stopped all vehicles 
systematically”); Acton, 515 U.S. at 658 (pointing out that “the drugs for which the samples 
are screened are standard, and do not vary according to the identity of the student”); Sitz, 496 
U.S. at 453 (taking into account that the sobriety checkpoints were “selected pursuant to the 
guidelines, and uniformed police officers stop[ped] every approaching vehicle”). 
205 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427. 
206 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000) (striking down drug 
checkpoints despite the fact that “traffic in illegal narcotics creates social harms of the first 
magnitude”); see also Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 86 (acknowledging that “drug abuse both was 
and is a serious problem,” but concluding that “‘the gravity of the threat alone cannot be 
dispositive of questions concerning what means law enforcement officers may employ to 
pursue a given purpose’” (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42)). 
207 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42; see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) 
(observing, in refusing to recognize a “murder scene exception” to the warrant requirement, 
that, while murder is an “extremely serious crime,” “the public interest in the investigation of 
other serious crimes is comparable”).  But cf. Cochran, supra note 11, at 36 (calling for a 
“national security detention” exception to the probable cause requirement). 
208 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42 (acknowledging that “the drug trade creates . . . daunting and 
complex” difficulties for law enforcement); see also Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393 (observing that 
“[t]he investigation of crime would always be simplified if warrants were unnecessary”). 
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In general, then, government officials encounter several hurdles in 
trying to justify witness detentions under the administrative search 
exception.  First, the primary purpose of the seizure must be some special 
need divorced from ordinary criminal law enforcement.  Where challenges 
are directed at a discretionary witness detention decision made by particular 
government actors, rather than at the administrative scheme as a whole, the 
subjective motivations of those individuals must be examined, although 
objective evidence can shed light on that inquiry.  If the seizure’s 
immediate goal is to collect evidence from a child abuse victim, or to 
investigate the witness herself rather than preserve her testimony, then 
government officials are not acting to serve a legitimate special need.  
Second, the administrative scheme must include some mechanism to cabin 
the discretion exercised by the government officials making these detention 
decisions—for example, a material witness warrant, a court order, or some 
form of “administrative” individualized suspicion.
209
  Finally, the 
government interests served by the detention must outweigh the intrusion 
on the witness’s privacy interests.  As discussed further in the Part that 
follows, the outcome of this balancing test is likely to be subject to 
considerable debate on the facts of particular cases and will turn on the 
circumstances of the witness detention at issue. 
IV. REASONABLENESS BALANCING 
Although the Supreme Court has often balanced law enforcement 
interests against individual privacy interests in deciding whether to create 
exceptions to the warrant requirement,
210
 two recent opinions—United 
States v. Knights
211
 and Samson v. California
212
—deviated from the Court’s 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and relied exclusively on this balancing 
test in finding that no constitutional violation occurred on the particular 
facts of the case.  The Solicitor General’s amicus brief in Camreta pointed 
to these two decisions in urging the Court that an intrusion “may be 
‘otherwise reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment’ 
irrespective of whether it is deemed reasonable under a special-needs 
 
209 For examples of this type of individualized suspicion, see supra notes 182–84 and 
accompanying text. 
210 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1966) (stop and frisk); see also, e.g., Michigan 
v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701–03 (1981) (detention of occupant during execution of search 
warrant); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467–68 (1971) (plurality opinion) 
(plain view); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967) (administrative 
inspections). 
211 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). 
212 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). 
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analysis.”
213
  Similarly, the dissenting Ninth Circuit judge in al-Kidd cited 
Knights as support for expanding the concept of probable cause to “any 
governmental interest . . . weighty enough to justify an intrusion into 
individual rights.”
214
  Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in al-Kidd 
made reference to “the Fourth Amendment’s separate reasonableness 
requirement for seizures,” although he did not mention either of these 
cases.
215
  Any extension of such a “freewheeling” balancing approach is 
unwise, however, and would leave government officials speculating as to 
when they were permitted to seize prospective witnesses.
216
 
At issue in Knights and Samson were search conditions imposed on 
probationers and parolees in California.  Knights agreed as a condition of 
probation that his person and property could be searched at any time, and 
the Court unanimously upheld a search of his residence based only on 
reasonable suspicion.
217
  Samson went a step further, allowing even the 
“suspicionless search” of a parolee pursuant to a California statute requiring 
every parolee to agree to submit to a search or seizure at any time.
218
  In 
both cases, the Court took the view that “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is reasonableness” and concluded that the searches were 
reasonable under the “general Fourth Amendment approach of ‘examining 
the totality of the circumstances’”—i.e., by balancing “‘the degree to which 
[the search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy’” against “‘the degree to 
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.’”
219
  The extension of Knights in Samson provoked three Justices 
 
213 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 112, 
at 25–26 (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 117–18); see also Brief for Petitioner James Alford, 
supra note 145, at 14, 37–38 (encouraging the Court to decide the case “according to a 
balancing of relevant public and private interests,” and citing Knights in support of the 
proposition that “the Court has found numerous widespread societal problems sufficiently 
grave to weigh in favor of searches or seizures conducted without a warrant, probable cause 
or in some cases individualized suspicion”). 
214 al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 987 n.7 (9th Cir. 2009) (Bea, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011). 
215 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2086 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  For a 
discussion of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, see supra notes 57–59 & 69–71 and 
accompanying text. 
216 Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 
855 (1994). 
217 Knights, 534 U.S. at 114, 122. 
218 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846 (2006). 
219 Knights, 534 U.S. at 118–19 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); 
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)); see also Samson, 547 U.S. at 848; 
Knights, 534 U.S. at 122 (“[O]ur holding rests on ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis that 
considers all the circumstances of the search.”). 
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to dissent, pointing out the “unprecedented” nature of holding that “a search 
supported by neither individualized suspicion nor ‘special needs’ is 
nonetheless ‘reasonable.’”
220
  But the majority responded that 
“reasonableness, not individualized suspicion,” drives the Fourth 




The amorphous balancing test in evidence in Knights and Samson has 
deservedly been subject to academic criticism, on the grounds that it can 
easily be manipulated to justify any particular result and therefore provides 
no real guidance to law enforcement.
222
  Fortunately, the Court does not 
seem ready to jettison its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in favor of a 
general reasonableness approach.  In fact, since Knights and Samson, it has 
been “business as usual” at the Court, with subsequent Fourth Amendment 
decisions paying lip service to the “reasonableness as ‘touchstone’” mantra 
but otherwise generally adhering to the warrant presumption model.
223
 
Should the Court decide, however, to use this approach in assessing 
the constitutionality of seizing witnesses, it is impossible to predict how the 
Justices would balance the competing concerns.
224
  Any criminal case 
involves important government interests, especially in terrorism and child 
 
220 Samson, 547 U.S. at 857–58 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
221 Id. at 855–56 n.4 (majority opinion) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U.S. 543, 561 (1976)). 
222 See, e.g., Anthony C. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. 
L. REV. 349, 393–94 (1974) (criticizing the “sliding scale approach” because it “converts” 
the law into “one immense Rorschach blot,” which can “only produce more slide than scale 
[and] means in practice . . . that appellate courts defer to trial courts and trial courts defer to 
the police”); Kaye, supra note 122, at 16 (arguing that the Court should not “do its own 
balancing” in cases that “merely enforce the criminal law,” but only in “exceptional cases” 
where “the interests differ . . . from the canonical ones for which warrants and probable 
cause are necessary”); George C. Thomas III, Terrorism, Race and a New Approach to 
Consent Searches, 73 MISS. L.J. 525, 544 (2003) (observing that “there is no original 
understanding of a ‘reasonable’ search, and that the Court has simply followed modern, 
relativistic usage in creating categories of searches that are, and are not, reasonable”).  But 
see Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 804 
(1994) (advocating that we “[keep] our eyes fixed on reasonableness as the polestar of the 
Fourth Amendment”). 
223 Kaye, supra note 122, at 20 (calling the approach taken in Knights and Samson “an 
anomaly” seemingly limited to “the two P’s—probationers, and parolees”).  For examples of 
recent Supreme Court opinions ignoring the reasoning used in Knights and Samson, see 
supra note 60. 
224 See Mark R. Brown, Rescuing Children from Abusive Parents: The Constitutional 
Value of Pre-Deprivation Process, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 913, 976 (2004) (pointing out that when 
there are “weighty loads on both sides of the scale, . . . straight-up balancing” is unlikely to 
provide “any meaningful insight”). 
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abuse investigations.  On the other hand, the law enforcement interests at 
stake when someone is still only a suspect may not carry the same weight as 
the goal of combating recidivism implicated in Knights and Samson.
225
 
Moreover, the privacy interests on the other side of the balance are 
obviously much stronger here, where the individual seized is merely a 
witness to a crime.  Witnesses and victims have a greater expectation of 
privacy than the suspects who are typically the subject of Fourth 
Amendment intrusions
226
—and certainly when compared to probationers 
and parolees.
227
  Finally, the other factors used in the special needs 
balancing context are relevant here as well, and here, as there, the results of 





The Fourth Amendment is not triggered every time the police wish to 
interview a prospective witness.  But when the authorities choose to “seize” 
a witness, they must comply with the dictates of that Amendment.  
Assuming they lack probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal 
wrongdoing on the part of the witness herself, law enforcement officials are 
wearing their administrative hats when they detain her and the special needs 
doctrine provides the only constitutional route for doing so. 
Despite the Court’s reluctance to entertain questions of subjective 
motivation in Fourth Amendment litigation, it has repeatedly recognized an 
exception in special needs cases.  For constitutional claims directed at a 
witness detention program as a whole, or a particular seizure mandated by 
the program, that purpose inquiry can be performed at the programmatic 
level.  But when the constitutionality of a government actor’s discretionary 
decision to seize a witness is challenged, the motivations of the individual 
official must be evaluated.  Otherwise, government officials have an 
opportunity to do an end run around the limitations on administrative 
 
225 See Samson, 547 U.S. at 853 (citing statistics showing a recidivism rate among 
California parolees around 70%); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 114, 120 (2001) (noting 
that probationers are “‘more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law’” and have 
“even more of an incentive to conceal their criminal activities . . . than the ordinary criminal” 
(quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987))). 
226 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
227 See Knights, 534 U.S. at 121 (noting that probationers have “significantly diminished 
privacy interests”); Samson, 547 U.S. at 850 (observing that parolees have even “fewer 
expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to imprisonment”). 
228 See supra notes 193–209 and accompanying text. 
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inspections and impermissibly use them for purposes of routine criminal 
law enforcement. 
Therefore, the special needs doctrine cannot justify the detentions in 
al-Kidd and Camreta if government officials used the federal material 
witness statute pretextually to arrest al-Kidd in order to continue their 
investigation of him, or if the primary motivation for seizing S.G. was to 
collect evidence to be used in prosecuting the criminal charges pending 
against her father.  Under those circumstances, the officials’ immediate 
purpose was not “to attend to [any] special needs” distinct from ordinary 
criminal law enforcement.
229
  Before the Supreme Court tackles any of the 
other constitutional questions that arise from witness detentions, hopefully 
it will correct the misstep it made in al-Kidd by indicating that the 
subjective motivations underlying the seizure of a witness are irrelevant to 
the Fourth Amendment analysis. 
 
229 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2081 (2011). 
